

Europe's New Security Vocation

MICHAEL J. BRENNER



Institute for National Strategic Studies
National Defense University

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE JAN 2002		2. REPORT TYPE N/A		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Europe's New Security Vocation				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Michael J. Brenner				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies Fort McNair Washington, DC 20319				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The original document contains color images.					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 96	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

About the Author

Michael J. Brenner is professor of international relations at the University of Pittsburgh. He researched and wrote this paper while serving as a distinguished visiting fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Dr. Brenner earned his Ph.D. at the University of California, Berkeley. He has published several works on Euro-American relations and European security, including *Terms of Engagement: The United States and the European Security Identity* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998), *NATO and Collective Security* (London: Macmillan, 1997), and articles in *Politique Etrangere*, *Internationale Politik*, *International Affairs*, *Survival*, and *Foreign Policy*. His latest work, coauthored with Guillaume Parmentier, is *Reconcilable Differences: U.S.-French Relations in the New Era* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2001).



The National Defense University (NDU) is a joint professional military education institution operating under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its purpose is to prepare military and civilian leaders for service at the highest levels of national defense and security. The principal operating elements of NDU are the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National War College, Joint Forces Staff College, Information Resources Management College, Institute for National Strategic Studies, and Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies.


The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) conducts strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and unified commanders in chief; supports national strategic components of NDU academic programs; and provides outreach to other governmental agencies and the broader national security community.

The Publication Directorate of INSS publishes books, monographs, reports, and occasional papers on national security strategy, defense policy, and national military strategy through National Defense University Press that reflect the output of university research and academic programs. In addition, it produces *Joint Force Quarterly*, a professional military journal published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Europe's New Security Vocation

Michael J. Brenner

McNair Paper 66



INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
2002

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. This publication is cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without further permission, with credit to the Institute for National Strategic Studies. A courtesy copy of any reviews and tearsheets would be appreciated.

First printing, January 2002

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office. To order, contact
Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, D.C.
20402-9328
(ISSN 1071-7552)

Contents

Foreword	v
Acknowledgments	vii
Chapter One	
Introduction	1
Chapter Two	
Perspectives on the Use of Force	13
Chapter Three	
EU–NATO Cooperation	41
Chapter Four	
Conclusion	73
Appendix	
Principal Institutions of the European Union	85
Endnotes	89

Foreword

The quest of the European Union (EU) to develop capabilities in security and defense affairs has been a surprisingly contentious issue in transatlantic relations over the past decade. Officials in EU governments have been perplexed that European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which they see as integral to building the EU in all of its dimensions, is viewed in some American political circles with trepidation, or even as a grave threat to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Most Europeans believe that ESDP will actually strengthen the Alliance by allowing Europeans to assume a larger share of the burdens of transatlantic security. While Washington has long professed support in principle for ESDP, American objections to specific EU defense initiatives have led some European governments to doubt the strength of that support. However, European efforts to press the development of ESDP in the context of recent crises have heightened American concerns that the project is designed to displace rather than bolster NATO. Some of the controversy can be attributed to periodic rhetorical flourishes by European officials that greatly overstate near-term ESDP capabilities or long-term goals. Certain American concerns are due, in part, to misperceptions and misunderstanding of ESDP structure and activities on this side of the Atlantic.

Michael Brenner's fluid and incisive analysis chronicles the development of ESDP and assesses its durability and driving political motivations. In the process, he helps to demystify the functioning of ESDP, which is of particular value to American readers unfamiliar with this initiative. Professor Brenner also advances a number of sound recommendations for U.S. policymakers about handling ESDP. As he argues, if Washington consults with European allies in ways that diminish concerns about American unilateralism, reduces restrictions on technology transfers critical to European defense modernization, and

develops reliable modalities for NATO–EU military cooperation, then the prospects that ESDP will evolve in a manner consistent with long-term U.S. interests will greatly increase. This paper sheds much light on a European project whose outcome is critical to American security.

Stephen J. Flanagan, Director
Institute for National Strategic Studies

Acknowledgments

In writing this paper, I have been the beneficiary of the hospitality, encouragement, and intellectual stimulation provided by the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University (NDU). I had the exceptional opportunity to spend a year at INSS as a distinguished visiting fellow at the invitation of Hans Binnendijk, then Director of the Institute. The INSS Director of Research, Stephen A. Cambone, and his colleagues engaged me in their project on the nascent European Security and Defense Policy where this study originated. The rich program of seminars and stream of European visitors created the ideal setting for tracking and interpreting policy trends on both sides of the Atlantic.

I wish to thank Dr. Cambone and Richard A. Kugler for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. A special word of appreciation goes to Stephen J. Flanagan who, as INSS Director, guided it to completion through multiple drafts with patience, good humor, and an unfailing critical eye. James A. Schear gave the manuscript attentive, judicious editing that helped refine the final product. My thanks go as well to Robert A. Silano, Director of Publications, for his professionalism and friendship.

Thanks are also due to the editorial staff of NDU Press—William R. Bode, George C. Maerz, Lisa M. Yambrick, and Jeffrey D. Smotherman—who brought this publication to completion under the supervision of Mr. Silano.

Introduction

The idea of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) has been a feature of the transatlantic security dialogue for a decade. The 1991 Maastricht Treaty foresaw an eventual incorporation of the Western European Union (WEU) as the defense arm of the European Union (EU). Endowing the Union with military capability was a logical extension of the commitment to a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as stipulated in the treaty. Both ideas, promoted by France and Germany, expressed the general desire of member states to play a more active role in securing the peace and stability of postcommunist Europe. Extending the principle of integration into the foreign policy field served two purposes. It was a means to tighten community bonds in the new, unsettled strategic environment by providing reassurance against the renationalization of defense policies. At the same time, it laid the basis for a collective effort to influence continental affairs consonant with the European venture in an orderly transition to democracy and market economies. The perceived need to add a security building block to the project of “constructing Europe” also reflected apprehension about a possible retreat of the United States from a Europe now free of the Soviet military threat. That possibility added further reason for West Europeans to make contingency plans for an uncertain future.¹

For the United States, having more militarily capable allies who are ready to shoulder heavier burdens has been a long-time goal, one that became more compelling in light of the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Allies able to do the difficult job of peacemaking and peacekeeping could ease the demands on the United States to police a continent where nationality conflicts are the main threat to peace. Furthermore, the cumulative effects of protracted peacekeeping on military readiness and morale are a growing concern. A more equitable distribution of duties also conforms to the U.S. reluctance to back committing its troops to

missions that risk casualties in doubtful causes that affect West Europeans more directly than they do Americans.

A decade of American experience in the Balkans and elsewhere has left unresolved the vexing question of whether and how to intervene. The prospect of more helpful allies in itself does not resolve how to measure national interest and judge whether intervention is justified. It does relieve, though, American worries that problems will go unattended unless the United States takes the lead. It also reduces the number of American troops needed for combined mission effectiveness. Yet accepting the terms of a more egalitarian Alliance partnership implicit in ESDI touches sensitive issues of cardinal importance to the United States: the institutional integrity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), its primacy on matters of European security, and the preservation of Washington's leadership prerogatives. The emergence of the European Union as a potential actor in the security realm heightens the challenge for American policymakers to retain the discretionary choice to abstain without losing substantial influence over collective crisis management.

Considerable diplomatic energy and political capital have been invested in efforts to reconcile claims on behalf of ESDI with established NATO arrangements. Through innovation and accommodation, a good measure of success has been achieved. In particular, the 1996 landmark agreement on Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) in Berlin allowed for an ESDI to develop within NATO without compromising its integrated structures.² The Berlin accord explains, in part, why the EU drive to create an autonomous security entity linked to it faltered at the Amsterdam Inter-Governmental Conference in 1997. Staunch British opposition, exploiting the NATO breakthrough, was instrumental in restricting advances to a set of procedural reforms. The principle of building ESDI within NATO was punctuated at the Fiftieth Anniversary summit in Washington in April 1999. There, the allies took a further step in officially welcoming an ESDI "under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU, or as otherwise agreed."³ These "Berlin-plus" accords were heralded as another landmark in Alliance accommodation to European aspirations. Ironically, that consent, affirmed in the new Strategic Concept, was granted just as the political momentum behind a renewed push to constitute an EU-based ESDI was cresting. At the later June summit of the European Union in Cologne, member states made the historic decision to give the Union

the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defense. . . . To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so . . . without prejudice to the actions by NATO.⁴

The European Council Declaration at Helsinki in December of 1999 further “underline[d] its determination to develop a capacity to take decisions . . . and to launch and conduct EU-led military operations.”⁵

The question of European defense was reopened and reformulated by the formal commitment to equip the Union with dedicated military forces supported by an organizational infrastructure. The series of initiatives—catalyzed by the Anglo-French Joint Declaration on European Defense issued at St. Malo in December 1998 and culminating in the Helsinki Declaration a year later—set in motion a process aimed at generating the means and political will for the European Union “to play its role fully on the international stage.”⁶ The renamed European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) commits members to an ambitious program for building a rapid reaction force at the corps level. The aim of this Helsinki Headline Goal is to have in place by 2003 a 60,000-person force, which is deployable within 60 days and sustainable for 18 months. A marked expansion in airlift and sealift is projected to make the force operational, and a complementary set of mechanisms for directing military operations and conducting a concerted diplomacy is being put in place. Detailed provisions for reifying the ESDP were formally approved at the Inter-Governmental Conference at Nice in December 2000. From the outset, this ambitious project has evoked approval from official Washington, along with some skepticism as to whether force-planning targets would be met and concern that redundant institution building might outpace capability building.

Plans to reify ESDI within the Union have been proposed, debated, and shelved on several occasions in recent years. The record of aborted takeoffs prompts the question of how serious the current enterprise is. The stakes are high, for, if the envisaged ESDP becomes reality, a rebalancing of the transatlantic partnership is inescapable.

ESDP is the logical outcome of the larger EU project of building an expanded set of supranational structures to deepen the community while enlarging its membership. The success of the ESDP enterprise, therefore, cannot be measured only in strict terms of military capabilities created. In the eyes of European leaders, it serves both a practical defense function and an institutional development function. American

leaders will concentrate on the former even while understanding and showing sympathy toward the latter, which makes it all the more important that the evolution of ESDP receives the careful management and skillful diplomacy needed to handle the issues that have been divisive in the recent past, such as burdensharing, the capabilities gap, the question of a legal mandate for peacemaking/peacekeeping operations, and rules of engagement for the use of military force. The greatest need is for sustained consultation in the adaptation of modes and methods for Euro-American cooperation. Reining in the impulse to act unilaterally is vital. If this delicate process is well managed, NATO—and the United States—will benefit from a stronger European Union more active and more competent in addressing security matters.

Is ESDP Real?

Notable qualitative differences exist between the present state of affairs and previous initiatives. Militarily, the EU states have set themselves the ambitious objective of constituting self-sustaining forces able to perform the full range of Petersburg tasks.⁷ As stipulated in the landmark declaration by the Union in June 1992, whereby it agreed to build a defense component, projected forces could be employed for humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, and crisis management, including peacemaking. The ESDP initiative carries through on that intention. In the language of the Nice Declaration:

the aim of the efforts made since the Cologne, Helsinki, and Feira European Councils is to give the European Union the means of assuming its responsibilities in the face of crises by adding to the range of instruments already at its disposal an autonomous capacity to take decisions and action in the security and defense field.⁸

Characterizing the envisaged rapid reaction force as autonomous means that it will have the potential to undertake missions without U.S. participation. Autonomy does not imply total independence from the United States, either in the sense of acting contrary to American policy or of preferring to strike out alone.

The question of independence was clarified at Nice. Independence as concept and objective had been a leitmotif of French commentary on ESDP. The use of the term by French President Jacques Chirac to characterize the force in creation was challenged by British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who firmly rejected the idea that a defense entity separate from NATO was in the works. Blair, under pressure from EU

skeptics at home, was taking pains to distance himself from anything that smacked of a federal European Union. Eager to avoid provoking American opposition and suspicion of French ambitions, most European governments tilted in the Blair direction. France prudently backed away from its espousal of a wholly independent ESDP. President Chirac affirmed that "NATO is the very foundation of our defense . . . there is no reason to get anxious." He went on, though, to make the point that "this European defense . . . should be independent with regard to SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe]" since "Europe is determined to make its own contribution to its own security."⁹ The allies did agree that any major operation undertaken in the foreseeable future would require access to some NATO assets (deployable headquarters and planning units) and U.S.-held assets assigned to NATO (lift, command and control, intelligence).

Reiteration of the term *autonomous* conveys the European conviction that they must achieve a measure of self-reliance in projecting forces capable of operating at the lower and middle levels of the combat scale. St. Malo broke new ground in stressing that the European Union should have the capacity for independent action "in order that its voice be heard in the world."¹⁰ The United States, for its part, has conceded that "development of a foreign and security policy . . . is a natural, even an inevitable, part of the development of broader European integration."¹¹ An ancillary benefit of augmented force capabilities is that Europeans would have more say in how combined operations with the United States are conducted. The former concern reflects the widespread belief that U.S. readiness to put American troops in harm's way cannot be taken for granted, as well as the judgment that the EU role in maintaining continental order should be expanded as a matter of principle. The latter encapsulates the lessons drawn from the Kosovo experience. Foremost, the European ability to shape intention and determine modalities of the air campaign was restricted by its relatively small contribution to Operation *Allied Force*. That reinforced the predominance of not only American officers but also American thinking in the NATO command structure. European leaders are sensitive to the fact that the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), was at times overridden by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington. As a consequence, military action was not as well integrated with diplomacy as most Europeans wanted. Interventions by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) were both sporadic and uncoordinated and did not provide consistent guidance on the overall operation. Arrangements that

American commanders experienced as intermittent obstruction with a coherent military plan were equally frustrating to some allied leaders for opposite reasons. The hand of those European governments that dissented from the tactics followed was weakened by the lack of a mechanism for consultation among themselves within the loose NAC framework. In sum, the conclusion drawn was that Europe should establish itself as a presence in handling security problems.

This conclusion was the theme of the WEU ministerial meeting in May 1999. With frustration over Operation *Allied Force* rising, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer expressed the ubiquitous sense that there should be “a rapid build-up of common EU forces to master crises and conflicts in Europe even without the participation of the United States. The Kosovo conflict expresses how urgent and indispensable this build-up will be for the future of Europe.”¹² The conviction that Europe should raise its profile on security matters was unmistakably clear, even if its pertinence to the seeming stalemate in Kosovo was obscure. Now, by setting specific force level goals and a timetable for reaching them, EU governments are staking the credibility of their avowed commitment to ESDP on reaching an unambiguous objective. That attests to their seriousness of purpose—even if meeting those goals fully by the stipulated date of 2003 is anything but certain.

The fact that American officials and Congress have seized on the Headline Goal as the acid test of whether the Europeans are genuine about preparing to perform a versatile set of missions raises the stakes of the Union making good on its commitment. The United States has made clear that support for an *autonomous* EU security entity is conditioned on Europeans strengthening their forces in line with the NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), agreed upon at the Washington summit, which calls for the upgrade of allied forces with an emphasis on deployability, viability, and sustainability.¹³

Although the stress that leaders on both sides of the Atlantic have put on building capabilities is genuine, conceptions of the ESDP project are not identical. Most European governments are dedicated to winning for the Union some measure of political autonomy. The creation of a rapid reaction force and supporting structures contributes to that end. As a report drafted by a group of influential security experts attached to the WEU (now EU) think tank in Paris puts it: “an essential dimension of the European approach aims . . . at a redefinition of the transatlantic structure of decision-making and action . . . through the realisation of capabilities.”¹⁴

Organizationally, an extensive apparatus to support both the putative CFSP and the envisaged military forces is rapidly taking shape. It includes the standing Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) backed by the permanent European Union Military Staff (EUMS). Adding to institutional resources are a situation center, a policy unit to receive and process intelligence data, and a satellite center. The appointment of Javier Solana—who served as Secretary General of the WEU until its final disposition in 2001—as both High Representative for the CFSP and Secretary General of the Council places in experienced hands the task of shaping the new security bodies. Solana's remit covers the prerogative to place items on the Council agenda when he deems that they are in the purview of ESDP and the responsibility to prepare materials for ministerial decision. More broadly, he can voice publicly European sentiment on outstanding issues, as he did in questioning the wisdom of the U.S. national missile defense initiative. This institutional development, fulfilling the Helsinki mandate, will by its very existence encourage EU states to take their own counsel, to act when conflict prevention or crisis management measures are indicated, and to activate military forces as necessary and appropriate. In short, ESDP is being institutionalized within the EU Council. By supplanting the WEU, ESDP ceases to be derivative of NATO, the formal acknowledgement of continued NATO primacy notwithstanding.

Politically, for the first time the 15 members are agreed on the value of an autonomous ESDP. Britain's *volte face* has made the critical difference. By aligning itself with France and entering the mainstream of continental thinking about the virtue of a defense component in the Union, Britain paved the way for launching the project while making available military assets crucial to its success. Britain and France now are slated to be the engines of ESDP construction, much as the Franco-German engine has been for other dimensions of European construction. The Blair government takes every occasion to reaffirm its bond to the United States, to reassure Washington that a European army is not in the making, and to pronounce the precedence of the Alliance. Nonetheless, Britain's promotion of ESDP has created a new political reality in Europe. As a senior British diplomat has put it, "Rather than creating a new security body, we are replacing an existing body that has not proven effective enough—the Western European Union—by one with far greater political, financial, and organizational muscle—the European Union. We are trading up for a more useful instrument."¹⁵ A defense

acquis is being added to the uncontested givens of the European Union.¹⁶ Inclusion of a defense dimension among legitimate EU areas of competence is now unanimously accepted as a necessary and natural extension of Union common foreign policy.

Strategically, ESDP is a piece of a larger project for enhancing EU means and aptitude for promoting the development of a European system cast in its own image. The motor forces behind ESDP, and its potential significance, can be understood only in reference to other major initiatives. The European Union is four historic enterprises: the launching of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); eastward enlargement; the program for restructuring community institutions and procedures begun at Nice and to be concluded at the Inter-Governmental Conference scheduled for 2004; and ESDP. Together, these enterprises form a strategy in which the Union progressively moves from serving as model and mentor for its eastern cousins to being an active agent in consolidating a Europe "whole and free." Simultaneously, it is equipping itself to be a force in world affairs more broadly. This is, by no means, solely a French aspiration; Tony Blair has echoed Jacques Chirac in proclaiming that the Union has reason and means to establish itself as a superpower on the international scene, albeit while avoiding the building of a superstate.¹⁷ As a consequence, the meaning that Europeans attach to ESDP goes beyond its instrumental value.

A rolling process is likely to occur over several years as the European Union moves to accomplish its quartet of projects. Although target dates have been set for reaching proximate goals in each project, the consequences of progress made (or not made) will not register according to a timetable. Adjustments will have to be made to account for unforeseen contingencies, including those resulting from the interplay between ESDP and the enlargement project. Over time, the Union may acquire characteristics that change its institutional form and outlook. Javier Solana has alerted Washington that "in a few years time, Americans will be talking to a larger and more influential Europe."¹⁸ The instruments and methods through which Europe will assert itself are something that no one is able to predict confidently. Accordingly, adaptations in existing mechanisms for Euro-American cooperation can be expected to occur in phases at irregular intervals. That incremental approach is all to the good; the complexity of the EU internal restructuring and enlargement precludes master plans or blueprints for renovating transatlantic structures. Consequently, the process of adapting transatlantic arrangements must be open and flexible.

This is not to say that American policy should be purely reactive. The United States can do much at the practical level to facilitate a smooth working partnership between NATO and the European Union. The Europeans share a need and expectation that the United States will lay down a clear and consistent policy line, emanating from both the White House and Congress, affirming that the ESDP enterprise will neither weaken the American resolve to remain more than a detached underwriter of European security nor engage in rearguard actions to slow its becoming a functioning reality. The Department of Defense (DOD) report, *Strengthening Transatlantic Security*, expresses an encouraging message. Commenting on European efforts, it concludes that

These efforts are part of Europe's longstanding and natural trend toward greater cooperation and deeper union . . . a trend supported by the United States since the early post-World War II period. America's leadership role has adjusted before to changes in Europe, and we are prepared to adapt ourselves in the future to work with stronger, more versatile, and more united European partners.¹⁹

The Legacy of Kosovo

Kosovo, rather than Bosnia, boosted ESDP, even though the West European performance was far more positive in Kosovo. The French and British took the diplomatic lead at Rambouillet, with American blessing (but with the United States looking over their shoulders). They and fellow EU members agreed from the outset on a tough stance against former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's systematic oppression of Albanians. Their readiness to engage was signaled early in the crisis, in October 1998, in dispatching a 5,000-person extraction force to Macedonia to backstop the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) corps of monitors, which was assigned to oversee compliance with the ill-starred accord engineered by Richard Holbrooke. Most important, the European allies supported Operation *Allied Force* without exception. In some instances, most strikingly that of Greece, they did so in the face of widespread popular opposition at home. Germany crossed an historic watershed by using its forces in a combat role for the first time since World War II. Operation *Allied Force* also was noteworthy for the French and German willingness to act without an explicit enabling resolution from the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Their qualms about taking military action despite the lack of legal cover have not been laid aside entirely; official policy in both countries still stresses the need for a prior

mandate from the world body. This remains a point of transatlantic friction. However, the demonstrated willingness to run military risks of a kind that were assiduously avoided in Bosnia is undeniable. Sustained unity of purpose and coordinated action throughout 3 months of high stress is an accomplishment that should not be disparaged—particularly when placed against the backdrop of hesitation and recrimination that characterized the European allies' conduct in Bosnia.

At the diplomatic level, EU governments showed a desire and an ability to move in formation. They pushed for a prominent role in the end game diplomacy and gave their full backing to Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, who was acting in the capacity of the EU envoy (his nomination by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright for the assignment notwithstanding). The Europeans worked with the United States as close partners and on more even terms than they were in the air campaign. The German government in particular is proud of its role in bringing Russia back into the diplomatic game and the success in winning Moscow's backing for the uncompromising ultimatum presented to a beleaguered Milosevic. President Ahtisaari was joined by former Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin in bearing the message to Belgrade. The Germans, and other Europeans, make a point of noting that Ahtisaari returned to report the success of his mission not to Bonn, where Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott had helped launch the mission, but rather to the EU summit meeting in Cologne. The message was clear: It was Europeans who were restoring peace to Europe. In the wake of the settlement, the Union stepped forward to take charge of the civilian administration of what had become a *de facto* protectorate. It provides the lion's share of the financial aid (over \$5 billion), and member states supply the bulk of the troops for Kosovo Force (KFOR). In April 2000, Eurocorps took command of KFOR under a Spanish general, although relying heavily on a NATO "headquarters." In addition, the European Union has promoted the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, a multifaceted, long-term program for the economic and political stabilization of the entire region. It is the most ambitious undertaking of the community beyond its own borders.²⁰

What explains this striking departure from the reticent behavior in the recent past? Most commentary on ESDP concentrates on European embarrassment at the demonstrated disparities between the sophisticated military arsenal of the United States and the Union's own meager contribution to the air war. This discrepancy had a shock effect on the military, the foreign affairs experts, and government leaders in

most Western European states. The inability to muster substantial deployable forces along with deficiency in precision guided munitions (PGMs) concentrated attention on the inefficiencies and redundancies of European defense establishments. The prospect of a widening gap roused fears of a two-tier Alliance. A functional differentiation dictated by qualitatively different weapons capabilities could result in strategic decoupling. Unless the Europeans take strong measures to redress the technological obsolescence of current arsenals, their value to the United States as a military power will decline—or, at least, be so perceived by those disposed to disparage the European contribution to meeting defense needs in and around Europe. Awareness of how European technological inferiority risks reviving in new terms the hoary issue of burden sharing has quickened interest in developing a European defense. The American “high tech” versus European “cannon fodder” paradigm was deeply troubling to contemplate.

Support for the initiatives embodied in ESDP is part of a growing consensus that the European Union must assume a custodial responsibility for political order across the continent. Many European political, business, and intellectual elites make a connection between the judgment that the Union should attempt to exert more control over its security environment and the conviction that the United States is becoming too preemptory in using its leadership prerogatives. For some, ESDP is “part of a broader EU attempt to balance the preponderance of U.S. hegemony”; to many, it is a tool for gaining more influence in NATO decisionmaking that is dominated by Washington.²¹ In studied emulation of the American “3Ds” mantra, which set the conditions of no *de-coupling*, no *discrimination*, and no *duplication* for Washington’s approval of ESDP, Europeans have formulated the “3Es” to portray the policy. Some EU officials, including the American ambassador, Guenter Burghardt, refer to *emancipation*, *Europeanization*, and *efficiency*.²²

Emancipation connotes liberation from excessive dependence on the United States and the perceived need to restrict U.S. unilateralism by building the European Union as a countervailing force within the overarching Euro-American partnership. Europeanization means the realization of a defense entity integral to the Union. Doing so both advances the continuing process of fostering an ever closer and more comprehensive union and serves the practical purpose of strengthening the EU capacity for promoting its external interests. The more efficient utilization of defense resources through integrated EU-wide projects and structures advances these purposes. The two ends are mutually reinforcing. For a growing segment of Western European policymakers, the idea of Europe having a security identity and role is a natural expression of

a maturing political community. ESDP is an element in a quasi-constitutional process that is conceding EU attributes of sovereignty by degrees. An increasing number of Europeans reject the dominant-subordinate relationship with the United States—however much they wish to maintain the active American presence in Europe. The integrated military command structure of NATO embodies that uneven relationship, which accounts for efforts to substitute for, circumvent, or place it under more stringent political oversight. Some share the French dedication to establishing a “Europe puissance” insofar as it stresses the imperative of Europe constituting a political force *per se* across a wide span of international issues. It conveys the common sense idea that the EU states should consult among themselves on questions that affect their well being as a matter of course and be prepared to act together if necessary. The erection of a security policy apparatus within the Union means that, over time, two multinational entities will occupy the political space of the West.²³ The potential ramifications of the ESDI initiative are wide-ranging even as attention focuses on the specifics of meeting force capability goals.

Perspectives on the Use of Force

This link between the projected augmentation of the European allies' military capabilities and the promotion of an autonomous political entity contributes to the hesitancy of the United States to embrace ESDP wholeheartedly. On strictly military grounds, a more competent set of allies is an attractive prospect—but on what terms? Does a larger allied contribution translate automatically into a challenge to American predominance in managing Alliance affairs? Will European governments be more inclined, and able, to promote an approach to conflict management distinctly different from the American one? How would the United States react to such an approach? The difficulty that U.S. officials have in giving clear-cut answers to these questions stems from their ambivalence as to the appropriate role for the United States in dealing with a post-Cold War European security agenda dominated by nationality conflicts. A distillation of Alliance experience in the Balkans has not produced a definitive set of policy guidelines. However, a discernible American approach exists, composed of three elements: selectivity, a broad, flexible mandate (when necessary), and appropriately robust rules of engagement. The capabilities and policies of the Europeans bear on each of them.

Selectivity

Retaining the discretion of when to act and when not to act serves the American interest. That decision is based on consideration of national concern and of domestic political factors. The former includes the assessment of stake, risk, situation tractability, and the part played by other parties. That appraisal is not in itself a determining factor. The aversion of the American public to the hazards of dealing with local nationality conflicts at the margins of their attention and comprehension is a fixed feature of the political landscape. So, too, is a deeply skeptical

Congress that consistently has been reluctant to support fully peace-enforcing operations in the Balkans. Indeed, during the Kosovo conflict, as Charles Kupchan has pointed out:

A month into a war that had not produced a single U.S. casualty, the House of Representatives nevertheless expressed grave misgivings, voting 290 to 139 to refuse funding for sending U.S. ground troops to Yugoslavia without Congressional approval. On the air war, the House's tie vote (213 to 213) on a resolution backing the bombing campaign was hardly a ringing endorsement.²⁴

The Bush administration does not view public and Congressional reluctance as a policy constraint in the same way that the Clinton administration did. Its own higher standard of what is worth the commitment of resources and the possible loss of American lives brings its official thinking more into line with skeptical opinion. However, any Chief Executive prefers to have the latitude to decide when conditions, including Alliance considerations, call for U.S. military deployment. Selectivity retains its value.

The prospective effects of the ESDP initiative on U.S. proclivity to intervene in local European conflicts are complex. Overall, ESDP would seem to strengthen the viability of the selectivity principle. All pertinent EU documents explicitly recognize that NATO, and thereby the United States, has the first right of refusal on a proposed operation. On any matter judged important enough to justify possible American involvement, there is no question of jurisdictional competition. Moreover, the improved EU readiness to perform the Petersburg tasks means that it will be in a position to take on responsibilities in circumstances where a decision on American intervention otherwise would be a close call. It eases the pressure on the United States to decide either to assume a potentially onerous burden or to allow a local conflict to fester. A militarily competent European Union, with the deliberative mechanisms and planned force capabilities of ESDP, might well have interposed a force between the Serbs and Croats in the early phases of the Yugoslav crisis that could have forestalled rapid intensification and spread of civil strife. The odds are now better that an all-European force with the wherewithal to do the job would be deployed.

More competent, more forthcoming allies are not an unmixed blessing. Although they take some of the pressure off an American administration, they can also reduce American influence. Enhanced European capabilities strengthen the position of those, especially in

Congress, who take a jaundiced view of *any* U.S. participation in peace-enforcing and peacekeeping missions. Their thinking is that if somebody else wants to tackle the problem and seemingly is able to do it, why should Washington simply not step aside. That will give pause to a White House already sensitive to the political risks of putting American troops and airmen in the line of fire. Signs that the United States prefers to abstain or that Washington is equivocating could encourage hawkish EU governments to show Union mettle. Conversely, an early decisive commitment by the European Union to act (however out of current character such speediness might be) could force an American administration to join in whatever mission is being considered so as not to lose leverage in the crisis-management process. That may leave inadequate time to build the requisite political support at home.

In the past, the United States has taken advantage of the discretion that it enjoyed by virtue of its indispensability, and the incoherence of its European partners, to alter the direction of American policy according to its own shifting assessments and mood swings in public opinion. Bosnia was the most striking case in point. The thinking of the Clinton administration oscillated between a policy of abstention and a policy of activism, and periods of benign neglect alternated with bouts of diplomatic energy as Washington importuned its allies to follow a strategy of “lift and strike.” Over the protracted life of the crisis, this vacillation repeated itself in multiple cycles. The European distress at American inaction from the sidelines was compounded by the erratic advice being offered. Ultimately, the United States overrode its allies by taking firm charge of the situation and pressing the aggressive campaign that concluded in Dayton (with the sympathetic cooperation of President Jacques Chirac’s newly elected government in Paris). While Bosnia had singular characteristics that are not likely to repeat themselves, it was instructive in underscoring the extraordinary latitude that the United States had to change its mind. That freedom was due in great measure to the tentativeness and self-doubts of Western European governments. In the future, they will be less divided and more resistant to American control—whatever the exact degree of unity and concert they achieve.

Some backers view ESDP as self-protection against erratic shifts in American policy, some of which are forced by a willful Congress. The Byrd-Warner resolution of spring 2000, which would have forced the withdrawal of American troops from KFOR, was a notable example of the latter. Barely defeated by a last-ditch defense by the White House, the resolution struck a nerve among the allies. In some capitals, it

provoked reconsideration of how ESDP should be presented to the United States. European leaders have presumed that by strengthening their ability to act with authority in handling conflicts, they bolstered the position of those in Washington dedicated to maintaining American commitments in Europe. Tangible evidence of allied burdensharing was seen as key when a President sought to bring the country and the Congress along with him in supporting American participation in an intervention on the lines of Bosnia or Kosovo. This logic shifts if the image of a militarily able set of allies is used to strengthen the case of those arguing that the American stake in Balkan-like ethnic conflicts is minor, and, therefore, Uncle Sam should stay on the sidelines. Apprehension has deepened with clear indications from President Bush's foreign policy team that they will reexamine with a jaded eye the policy of contributing substantial American ground troops to peacekeeping missions. They envisage a new division of labor in which an empowered set of allies relieves the United States of the need to participate in Stabilization Force (SFOR) and KFOR types of missions.

The allies perceive a new danger on the horizon that disturbs their picture of a healthy, rebalanced Atlantic Alliance: a possible political decoupling of the United States from Europe in managing substrategic security problems. Consequently, some parties have become inclined to underplay European autonomy and not to overstate current capabilities. Striking the right balance in meeting American expectations about reaching the Headline Goal without encouraging the forces of insularity in the American body politic has complicated how the architects of ESDP manage the delicacies of both transatlantic and domestic American politics.

Looking to the future, a cardinal U.S. concern will be that the European proclivity to act is commensurate with their ability to match means to ends. The nightmare scenario for American officials is being called upon to salvage a failed mission or to rescue an allied force. The anxious point of reference is the acute dilemma in which the Clinton administration found itself in the summer of 1995. It stemmed from a confused, UN-directed allied mission and transatlantic dissonance.²⁵ Committed to extricating the UN Protection Force if its mission were to collapse, the administration found itself faced with the prospect of choosing between dispatching a U.S. expeditionary force to punctuate a Western humiliation (incurring the high risk of casualties along the way) or dealing a heavy blow to Alliance unity by staying aloof. A host of errors and miscalculations over the preceding 4 years brought the

Alliance to that precipice. The European lack of preparedness for taking collective action was a major factor in putting the Western powers in so dire a predicament. A capable ESDP that prudently seeks to engage the United States wherever possible and acts with sobriety when venturing out on its own would largely remedy that defect.

The EU concentration on the Petersburg tasks has an ancillary benefit. Peacemaking and peacekeeping missions often entail a conflict phase followed by a policing-cum-reconstruction phase. The U.S. interest in avoiding the need to place military personnel in a peacekeeping role is served by the availability of allies adept at, and prepared to commit themselves to, those noncombat functions. Thus, the United States has sound practical reasons to encourage ESDP governments to conserve their strictly peacekeeping capabilities even as America urges them to build up warfighting capabilities. In this respect, EU neutrals have a notable contribution to make. The Scandinavians especially have extensive experience serving in UN missions and the backing of public opinion for performing what are broadly seen as classic peacekeeping functions of mediation and monitoring.

Evolving plans for ESDP do take note of the exceptional asset represented by neutral members. On the initiative of Sweden, the Union has set itself a goal of constituting a reserve corps of civil police officers specifically trained for light peacekeeping duties. The goal is to have available 5,000 officers earmarked for such crisis missions. A core contingent of 1,000 could be deployed and in place within 30 days. Plans envisage using the force either as part of a stabilization program intended to calm political unrest or to restore civil order in the wake of armed strife. In principle, the contingent would be available for joint operations that the European Union might undertake in conjunction with other international bodies (for example, the UN, OSCE, or NATO).²⁶ Creation of a police corps to perform peacekeeping duties is particularly attractive to neutral EU members as a congenial way to demonstrate solidarity with other governments. However, early indications are that constituting such a force is more difficult than foreseen. The diversity of experience, training, and organization among earmarked national police units complicates the task of melding them into a body capable of operating under what would be exceptional conditions. Still, the potential value of such a force as a component of the overarching ESDP structure taking shape is evident and the commitment to developing it is firm.

Speculation about ESDP plans and operations should take into account that EU governments value ESDP for what it adds to the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. Governments aim to play to Union strengths by linking the defense component to existing soft security instruments. They see the PSC as the pivotal body which, properly embedded within the wider EU system, cooperates closely with the European Commission (EC) and observes the rules of full consultation and consensus-building that govern other parts of the community. Italy and Sweden are most forthright in conditioning their backing for ESDP on its integration into the EU core—that is, autonomous vis-à-vis NATO but not autonomous in distancing itself from preexisting EU structures. German policymakers generally share this perspective. Berlin will play a crucial role in reconciling the building of hard military capabilities (and a readiness to use them) with a mode of approach to conflict management that sees military action as the option of last resort.

Meeting the Headline Goal will provide the necessary condition for the European Union to take effective military action. The sufficient factor—the will and sense of purpose of EU governments—remains problematic, however.

The Mandate Issue

Having the maximum latitude in setting the terms for any military operation is in American interest and is a natural complement to safeguarding its right to be selective in choosing when it will act. Peace-enforcing and peacekeeping missions are no exception to the principle of Washington retaining the ability to determine how it will engage and use its military forces. A legitimizing resolution from the UN Security Council (UNSC) is generally desirable but is not a precondition. Despite its initial fixation on “assertive multilateralism,” the Clinton administration ultimately adopted a qualified, cautious attitude toward international legal mandates.

To be sure, acting under the legal authority of the UNSC can have other benefits. An enabling UNSC resolution can provide the basis for mobilizing military and diplomatic support, as it did during the Persian Gulf crisis. It also sets a legal norm of acceptable international conduct, thereby constraining others who might be inclined to use force for malign purposes. Russia’s impulse to police the Commonwealth of Independent States, for example, could more readily be held in check by proscriptive rules on unendorsed interventions. U.S. hopes for melding UN and NATO multilateralism have not been realized. Taking the

UNSC route has entailed restrictions as well as opportunities for collective intervention. The early optimism raised by Russian collaboration and Chinese indifference gave way to pessimism as both countries increasingly perceived their national interest in curbing what they saw as a hegemonic United States arrogating to itself, and to NATO, broad powers to use force according to its own dictates—as it did in Bosnia, Iraq, and Kosovo.²⁷

The difficulties encountered in setting new terms for collective action with the Western allies are aggravated by differences over the need and value of obtaining UNSC endorsement for undertaking military operations. The two planes of collective action have intersected insofar as most allies insist on prior UN approval as the *sine qua non* for their participation in missions directed against a sovereign state. Hence, any move to underscore the consensus principle within NATO (or among any coalition of the willing) will bring to the fore disagreements about the principle of having UN imprimatur. This truth was obscured by the tacit agreement to launch Operation *Allied Force* without clear legal authorization. Allied governments chose to override the opinion of legal advisors who claimed that they were acting with dubious authority. France, which has been most forceful in asserting the UN mandate as an essential precondition for military action, found it convenient to abandon its strict constructionist position. French flexibility in using a loose interpretation of existing UNSC resolutions on Kosovo (1160, 1199, 1203), which were passed on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter to legitimate the air assault, was a case of expedient interest prevailing over procedural principle. While declaring that those resolutions were “sufficient unto the day,” in the words of Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine, French leaders went out of their way to make clear that Kosovo did not constitute a precedent-setting departure from the norm.²⁸

Likewise, the German government cited the compelling need for prompt, decisive action in explaining its readiness to deviate from the country’s otherwise firm position that its armed forces would be deployed only outside its borders when acting on behalf of the UN (or, derivatively, the OSCE). The Schroeder government’s historic decision is all the more noteworthy for the legal and political hurdles it had to overcome. The 1994 ruling of the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe that cleared the way for German participation in the Implementation Force and SFOR in Bosnia explicitly cited the requirement that any peace-enforcing or peacekeeping operation have legal authorization from the international community. As for public opinion, the long-standing taboo

against engaging German troops for any reason other than national defense, coupled with skepticism about the morality and utility of using force generally, posed a serious challenge to the government.

The presence of the Green Party in the coalition government meant that the issue would be joined at the highest decisionmaking level. Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer was the critical figure who passionately made the case for intervention on moral grounds to the pacifist elements in his own party and to the country at large. In effect, the German leadership used the principles and ideals of Germany's postwar political culture to generate support for a righteous cause that had a claim on the national conscience. In this respect, their appeals shared something with those of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt, whose calls to arms were made in the name of defending American core values by which the country defined itself rather than in strict security terms. German solidarity with allies in the air campaign, its flawless conduct as the loyal partner, lent authority and credibility to its energetic campaign for negotiations. Fischer persistently pressed the German plan for "bringing Russia back on board the boat" and turned it into a key instrument for breaking the deadlock with Slobodan Milosevic. In this way, the Schroeder-Fischer team was able to maintain the broad consensus in the Bundestag for the war while acting, in Europe's name, to promote a peace formula that met allied conditions.²⁹

The idea of acting in the name of Europe provides legal as well as political cover for a German foreign policy that skillfully is building its stature as a large power able and willing to act without complexes. Germany has a pervasive feeling that EU partners are attentive to the virtue of acting with international legality—in contrast to the maverick ways of the United States. An operation that represents a collective decision by the 15 members, in this sense, is perceived as doubly authoritative since it is generated through the legitimacy-producing, supranational process of the European Union, whose members adhere to similar norms of "correct" international behavior. Thus, Berlin will be inclined to involve the Union in crisis management, as well as conflict prevention, whatever NATO role is dictated by military needs, and however highly the Euro-American partnership is valued. As a side effect, the Franco-German co-leadership of the European Union is thereby strengthened insofar as France trumpets most loudly the themes of UN-based legality and the cause of Europe's puissance. On neither count can Great Britain, the other member of the ESDP leadership trio, compete with France.

Germany and France share the conviction that authorization by the UNSC normally should be a precondition for military intervention. Their motivations, though, are not identical. Paris seeks to constrain an overweening United States whose self-confidence and turbulent domestic politics together impel it to act unilaterally and, at times, impetuously. French insistence on seeking a UNSC mandate aims at imposing a procedural restraint. It complements the French policy objective of developing the European Union into a force capable of countervailing American power—within the Alliance and on the wider international stage. It also conforms to the French campaign to empower NATO political bodies—the Political Committee and the North Atlantic Council—to set the strategic parameters for and to oversee military operations directed through Alliance integrated force and command structures. Foreign Minister Védrine sketched the French strategic perspective this way:

A major factor in the world today [is] the overriding predominance of the United States in all areas and the lack of any counterweight. We have to methodically broaden the basis for agreement among Europeans. We have to coordinate with the United States all along the line on a basis agreed by all European states, combining a friendly approach with the need to be respected, and defending organized multilateralism and the requirements of the Security Council under all circumstances. Finally, we have to plan politically, institutionally, and mentally for the time when Europe has the courage to go further.³⁰

That is, France needs to strike out on an independent course free of moral obligation to the United States.

Viewed in this perspective, the stress that France places on working through the UN system expresses its belief in the value of a *concert* approach to managing world conflicts as much as it does devotion to the idea of collective security. The Security Council is a venue in which the major powers, including France, with broad interests in a stable, equilibrated international system, can convene and deliberate with the objective of coming up with a commonly acceptable strategy. From the French standpoint, countries with a significant interest in a latent conflict situation, too, should contribute to the process of collective conflict prevention and crisis management. This is why France (like Germany) so strongly encouraged Russian involvement in seeking resolution of both the Bosnian and Kosovo crises—within and outside UNSC. For the same combination of reasons, Paris resists expanding the functional and geographical scope of NATO, inveighing against U.S.-

inspired plans allegedly designed to turn it into a modern-day Holy Alliance that arrogates to itself the authority to decide where and how it might intervene. Accordingly, it led the rearguard at the NATO Washington summit to narrow the scope of the Alliance's Strategic Concept.

France, therefore, embeds the mandate issue in a larger construct that draws from traditional conceptions of international politics: balance of power, national interest, relative rather than absolute security—and the diplomacy to operationalize them. Germany, by contrast, has greater faith in the UN potential for collective action on behalf of the world community. In practice, the thinking of the two countries converges on the mandate issue, as it does on the necessity for bringing Russia into a working partnership with the West. German success in engaging Russia as an honest broker between NATO and Slobodan Milosevic reinforced the conviction that collaboration need not be based on expedient calculations of narrow national interest but rather on a common enlightened interest in a stable European order. The German-Russian “strategic partnership” pronounced by Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and President Vladimir Putin at their Berlin summit in June 2000 conforms to that line of thinking.³¹ Building on that premise, Germans stress the practical wisdom of a resort to UNSC for the authority to take military action.

Most other European allies of the United States have an outlook akin to that of Germany. (Britain is the exception, and the Netherlands a partial one.) Various reasons and reasoning include, *inter alia*, constraining perceived American unilateralism; satisfying internal political requirements; or cleaving to a narrowly drawn peacekeeping mandate so as to avoid the risks of more ambitious peace-enforcing missions. Together, they can be expected to generate heavy pressure to seek UN cover in cases where crisis management carries the possibility of military action. Within the ESDP structures, the PSC and Council, this approach may predominate. It will not readily be offset by aggressive American lobbying as occurs in the North Atlantic Council. Moreover, neutral EU members are among the strongest advocates of an absolutist position on the mandate issue. Their influence will be magnified by the high value that EU institutional culture places on consensus. The Union is itself also highly legalistic and observant of rigid rule-bound procedures, strengthening the preference to act under UN aegis. The inclination to place greater faith in conciliation than in confrontation will further reinforce this preference. Recognition of these

truths spurred the vigorous American effort to narrow the scope and opportunity for ESDP structures to function separately from NATO structures. Arrangements agreed to at the NATO and EU summits in December 2000 that provide for joint meetings and elaborate consultations are designed to preclude any kind of EU crisis-management strategy from crystallizing.

Despite those American-inspired safeguards, presuming a ready EU consensus when faced with a real-life security problem would be erroneous. Divisions could open between member states with an activist bent (Britain and France) that will seek a way to balance considerations of legitimacy and effectiveness and those inclined to link the EU traditional caution with UN proceduralism in a soft approach to crisis management. Paradoxically, so orienting ESDP may give France pause at being locked into a rigid process of consensus-building with partners who do not share its attitude on how to deal with potential conflict situations and who are more devoted to the principle of legal mandates than France is. For this reason, Paris as well as London places high value on provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty and the Cologne/Helsinki Declarations that allow for coalitions of the willing.

Ironically, the latent interest of some EU governments, Paris especially, in direction by a concert roughly parallels the logic that is leading some American security planners to think seriously about the relative merits of U.S.-led ad hoc operations. They visualize coalitions acting under some form of NATO endorsement and relying on NATO command structures. France, by contrast, would prefer to act with an EU endorsement while relying on European command structures and military assets to as great an extent as possible. In a situation where the two organizations were to convene to address a conjectural problem (whether sequentially or concurrently), the cumulative procedural complications, including pressures for some form of referral to UNSC, could have the effect of making ad hoc action an attractive option in both Paris and Washington.

American policymakers, overall, have some issues in regard to the European preoccupation with the mandate question. Americans find this focus tiresome because the repeated proclamations of the legal imperative to obtain UNSC authorization are disconnected from the practicalities of crisis management and coercive diplomacy. They believe that it is illogical because, in Kosovo, all Western leaders recognized the compelling need to act with or without formal authorization. It was a precedent, whether admitted, and a sound one at that. To

make any conjectured military action in future contingencies dependent on the political backing of China and Russia is to handcuff the Western powers at times when common interests may call for timely action. How can acceptance of that constraint be reconciled with the multiple commitments made to upholding standards of acceptable conduct across the continent? Washington also finds the mandate preoccupation irksome because it sees its European partners as unjustified in enlisting other states to hinder the United States in what it views as the judicious exercise of its influence to meet exceptional obligations and leadership responsibilities.

These divergent outlooks stem from contrasting historical experiences and different locations in today's international system. Americans believe that the U.S. force carries its own legitimacy since it serves no selfish interest; rather, it serves the enlightened causes of defending freedom, fostering democracy, and opposing threats to international peace—all seen as collective goods for the world community. Europeans instinctively are more sensitive to how destructive the play of power has been in the past and how it can be counterproductive today unless employed with prudence and discretion. Although allies do not question American ideals and motives, some do doubt Washington's judgment and take exception to its alleged self-righteousness. As loyal allies who are also partners in the great enterprise of building a world order on enlightened principles, they believe it is their duty to counsel prudence and restraint in American use of its enormous power. To this way of thinking, insistence on acting under the aegis of the United Nations serves that end. Grievances about the alleged failure of the United States to consult fully with its allies before the fact add to the desire to find methods for ensuring that collective deliberation precedes and informs any decision to use, or threaten the use of, military force. Developing ESDP points in that direction.

The United States has succeeded in finessing the mandate issue. At the Washington Fiftieth Anniversary summit in April 1999, America foiled attempts to introduce precise language in the new Strategic Concert that would have required an enabling UNSC resolution. The communiqué states:

We recognize the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. . . . We look forward to developing further contact and exchanges with the United Nations in the context of cooperation in conflict prevention, crisis management, and response operations, including peacekeeping and

humanitarian assistance. . . . The Alliance will consider on a case by case basis future cooperation of this kind.³²

With American encouragement, a similar compromise was written into the Helsinki Declaration that leaves some ambiguity as to whether such an explicit resolution was necessary or merely desirable. The Presidency Conclusions affirm:

The Union will contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The Union recognizes the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Union will cooperate . . . in a mutually reinforcing manner in stability promotion, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction.³³

The European Union, like NATO, has left itself considerable room for liberal interpretations of the commitment in principle to act in accordance with UN rules.

Still, in actual cases, the United States will come under pressure to seek a UN mandate. Unless a compelling, immediate threat exists to serious Western interests or an equally compelling humanitarian crisis is in the offing, diverse allied preferences will arise. If a pronounced European viewpoint emerges different from the American one, lines of allied consultation could become entangled. To alleviate that problem, the United States should strive to fashion a common line of thinking with its most militarily competent allies (Britain and France) and politically influential ally (Germany) as to what are the minimal forms of authorization needed for diverse contingencies. Depending on circumstances, the United States might also find common ground with allies in a liberal reading of a preexisting UN resolution, as occurred on Kosovo—however much some allies insist that it is not a precedent. A case can be made for a similarly liberal reading of provisions in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In principle, the United States has a third option. It can refrain from participation in a UN-sanctioned mission if it finds the terms inimical to achieving its desired ends or securing the welfare of its personnel (as was the case in Bosnia between 1991 and 1995). Abstention, though, could be considered only if the matter in question were of marginal interest to the United States. Then, the readiness of the European allies to step into the breach would make it easier for Washington to stand aside—even if doing so exposes it to criticism for not doing its international duty.

Prudent officials will anticipate situations where disagreements over the interpretation of a mandate are a surrogate for serious differences between the United States and the European Union, as a collectivity, on the appropriateness and acceptable limits of military action. Allies may agree that an ambiguously worded UNSC resolution provides sufficient basis for taking action but diverge in their views of the scope of action it permits. That was the case with regard to enforcement of the no-fly zone over Iraq where America and the United Kingdom were at loggerheads with France. A clear-cut line of division between the Europeans en bloc and the United States is unlikely. Were such circumstances to arise, it could be taken as an occasion to force the ESDP states to confront the reality of acting on their own, assuming that neither major American interests nor credibility were at stake. A reasonable test for ESDP could have the salutary effect of testing the newfound will and capabilities of the Europeans. Indications of inadequacy would demonstrate the need to redouble efforts to address insufficiency.

Effectiveness

Enhanced European capabilities mean that the tradeoff between achieving an equitable burdensharing and effectiveness is less stark. Consequently, the United States can be somewhat more relaxed about ceding a larger role for allies in combined missions. That in turn should assuage anxieties among the American public and Congress about dangerous deployments where no compelling national interest is threatened. It should also help the Bush administration to achieve its objective of concentrating its force planning on first-order threats while retaining broad discretion about whether and how to participate in peace-enforcing and peacekeeping missions. How the perception of more forthcoming and capable allies will play in American policy debates cannot be accurately predicted. A good starting point is the proposition that a skeptical public opinion is a healthy check on the impulse toward indiscriminate interventions driven by the Cable News Network (CNN) factor. That skepticism could be reinforced by expectations that somebody else is doing the job. However, the evident readiness of the Europeans to shoulder more of the load could have the opposite effect; that is, more equitable burdensharing may be justification for Americans joining an operation.

Similar uncertainty surrounds the question of how an operative ESDP will affect U.S. options for structuring collective operations. That

question is especially salient for those who judge harshly Operation *Allied Force* as the epitome of warmaking by committee. Rejecting the proposition that the undeniable flaws in the design and conduct of the air campaign are inherent to combined operations undertaken through a formal alliance structure still leaves reason to ponder the terms of American collaboration with more self-assertive allies—whether individually or as a tacit caucus whose sense of collective identity, and perhaps common viewpoint, has been strengthened by ESDP experience. This concern prompted the Clinton administration to take a tough line on the contours of the EU–NATO framework agreement. It pressed successfully to minimize how much room EU bodies would have to deliberate and act on their own in the earliest stages of managing a manifest crisis. The accords provide for frequent and intense consultations at every level.

Enmeshment notwithstanding, differences over how to conduct combined operations are expected at times to be more acute and more resistant to resolution when the United States has a less dominant role. A larger European contribution commonly means more influence—an unmistakable and unavoidable aim of its promoters. The alternatives for the United States are to go it alone (at considerable diplomatic cost and the loss of backing in sections of American public opinion) or to lead a coalition of the deferentially willing outside of the formal Alliance structure along the lines of Operation *Desert Storm*. That course, though, may deny the United States the help of countries that it would like to have alongside it. The latter option has some appeal for those impatient with the delays and tensions associated with truly multilateral forms of decisionmaking. One cannot know in advance whether the more orthodox option of working with allies through the formal NATO apparatus will produce superior performance or instead impede the efficient application of military force. The problematic element increases as a consequence of ESDP, however tightly interwoven are NATO and EU bodies. Indeed, those arrangements could expand European opportunity to influence American strategic preferences. Ready accord on objectives and on the contours of a strategy for reaching them may hold the promise of smooth cooperation that is belied in practice as the operation unfolds. In Kosovo, disagreements on how to conduct the air campaign emerged incrementally, largely due to the absence of an agreed strategic plan at the onset of hostilities and inadequate contingency plans. Achieving agreement in advance is no easy matter, especially when force is part of a larger exercise in coercive diplomacy.

To face squarely the hard choices about taking military action that *could* arise puts governments (or their publics) on the spot who find it unpalatable except under the most exigent circumstances. Yet in the future, the importance of being explicit about the planned scope and intensity of a military campaign will increase because the United States no longer could be cast as the "heavy" whose irresistible pressure forced reluctant governments to take action more drastic than they preferred. Accountability for Europeans is companion to the augmented capabilities that they are building.

Does an appreciable gap remain between American and European attitudes toward the use of force? The Kosovo experience increased the tendency to assume that the gap has narrowed markedly, if not closed entirely. The Helsinki Goals and the concrete steps registered at the Capabilities Commitment Conference in November 2000 point to the same conclusion. There, EU governments underlined their "determination to develop an autonomous capacity . . . where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises."³⁴ A closer reading of the situation, however, suggests a less sanguine assessment. While the trend line in the thinking of political elites indisputably leads to a growing readiness to take military action, a discernible European approach to conflict remains, as does a body of public opinion deeply skeptical of using coercion to settle disputes. This is especially so on the continent—except in France—where the "civilian" mentality is pronounced. In Germany, Italy, and elsewhere, more weight is placed on seeking to prevent conflicts through political engagement and constructive dialogue; confrontation and military action are seen as measures of last resort. That inhibition was shed on Kosovo because of the overriding need to act with all means available to prevent a perceived humanitarian disaster. A decade of experience with Slobodan Milosevic's ruthless ways, moreover, gave little hope that milder methods would work.

If the question of military action arises in future crises, the balance might be struck otherwise. Germany, above all, will have to contend with a public opinion being pulled in opposite directions by its pacifist inclinations and its finely honed sense of international morality. ESDP may heighten the tension, for the issue of what should be expected of a good European citizen will permeate the domestic debate, with unpredictable effects on the outcome. As Hanns Maull has cogently argued, "Germany will continue to be guided by the old principles, and it will continue to try to reconcile them as much as possible with the new

exigencies of a radically different security environment. A direct challenge to the civilian power role concept is therefore unlikely in the foreseeable future.”³⁵ Germany’s backing for utilization of the ESDP machinery will remain strong. The restructuring of the Bundeswehr into a more professional and mobile force will continue to the extent that financial constraints permit. Equally, devotion to creating a European rapid reaction corps will be accompanied by a policy that continues to accord precedence to political means and methods.

The conduct of the air campaign over Kosovo demonstrated that the United States and several of its European allies differ as to how military force should be applied.³⁶ The Europeans generally favored a more restrained, incremental strategy. For them, coercive force was an instrument for signaling intent. By leaving room for Milosevic and the Serb leadership to make the necessary adjustments in risk calculations, the way for a diplomatic resolution would be cleared. Most military opinion on the American side strongly favored a sharp, sustained attack against high-value enemy assets at the onset of the air campaign. Yet the Clinton administration took an approach roughly analogous to that of its allies in its first phases. Positions began to diverge as administration thinking shifted in the direction of a more intense strike extended to hit a wider array of high-value economic (and politically symbolic) targets in Serbia proper. Frustrated by meager results from attacks on Serb forces in Kosovo, Milosevic’s recalcitrance, and erosion of popular support on the home front, the United States sought to force a change in calculations being made in Belgrade. Its underlying premise was that a higher level of pain had to be inflicted for maximum shock effect before a reversal of Serb policy could be expected.

A corollary element in the current, and different, European and American modes of approach was the level of tolerance for damage inflicted and damage suffered. Europeans had greater sensitivity to collateral injuries to the civilian population in Yugoslavia and to their suffering severe economic deprivation. Queasiness was more pronounced in some European countries than others, with Britain at one end of the continuum and Germany, Italy, and the Scandinavian countries at the other. Overall, the allies were distinctly less stoic on this score than was the United States. All governments suffered pangs of conscience and popular revulsion at casualties caused by errant missiles and bombs, but nothing cracked the solidarity of the Alliance. How much longer that unity could have been maintained in the face of stubborn Serb resistance to intensified air strikes is unknown, however.

Dismay in Europe at the bombing impact on civilian population stemmed in part from an incomprehension of the Clinton administration's zero-casualty standard for Operation *Allied Force*. The apparent link between the readiness to take military action relying on PGMs and the expectation that it could do so at minimal risk to American personnel disturbs some Europeans: They infer that American leaders may find it politically difficult to sustain a military engagement if U.S. forces were to incur significant losses. As General Klaus Naumann has put it: "We know what Americans are ready to kill for; we do not know what they are ready to die for."³⁷ The worst-case scenario that critics of the U.S. approach envisage is that a confrontational, gung-ho America pulls the allies into a shooting war and then lowers the chances of success by bending the military strategy to the unrealistic requirements of American politics. The result could be precipitous action to resolve it—whether drastic escalation or an expedient diplomatic escape hatch. The latter was belied by the Clinton administration's apparent willingness to consider a ground campaign rather than accept an embarrassing political defeat in Kosovo. A strain of skepticism remains, though, about the tolerance for risk-taking in the American body politic generally and whether the President actually would have climbed out on that dangerous political limb. The Bush administration has raised the bar for what is "worth the commitment of resources and the potential loss of American lives,"³⁸ but has offered no more fixed standards for U.S. allies to plan against than did its predecessor. The reaction of the American public to the events of September 11 certainly has stiffened the resolve to accept the full consequences of military action in Afghanistan. How far that attitude change extends is less certain.

Consequently, the move to develop ESDP and associated military capabilities is visualized as serving multiple purposes, all of which derive from a perceived overdependence on a dominant yet unpredictable American ally. This logic points to a need to establish Europe within NATO as well as outside it. Preparation for the latter is, at the level of political psychology, linked to the former. The French government is the only one to make this point explicitly. Defense Minister Alain Richard has repeatedly presented the argument that a European defense serves two purposes: to be able to act independently of SHAPE by creating an option for a self-reliant EU-only operation without recourse to NATO assets and to "provide for a firm handle on . . . the levers of influence" on a common NATO operation. As Richard has said, "the Kosovo experience has reminded us that each nation

weighs on the whole in proportion to its own military contribution.”³⁹ The French are not alone in their conviction that a revamping of arrangements for political oversight of military operations is necessary. Some of the smaller allies mildly resent that some serious points of difference are sorted out among the United States and its major partners before consideration by the North Atlantic Council. They fear a similar *modus operandi* taking hold within ESDP security structures. Indisputably, Washington made certain unilateral decisions as to the use of stealth aircraft and some cruise missile strikes without prior consultation, even informing officially allied governments after the fact. Other problematic questions concerning targeting, strategy, and weapons deployments were sorted out in the complex interplay between SACEUR, General Wesley Clark, and senior decisionmakers in DOD. Allied governments were not party to that discourse.⁴⁰

Understandably, some European leaders were dismayed that decisions on matters of capital importance were being deliberated in channels inaccessible to them. One answer to the issues raised by American predominance in Alliance policymaking, reinforced by a dual chain of command, is more European input and better coordinated efforts to exert influence. Whatever form that might take, it would entail more formal, regularized oversight by the North Atlantic Council. That would prove hard to square with the discontents of American commanders who chafed at the NAC intrusions. Their frustration over the restrictions imposed by the diplomatic dynamics of a 19-nation coalition has left a sour taste that is all the more irritating because Kosovo seems to be the model for coalition operations to come, at least those that mix military and political elements as did Operation *Allied Force*.⁴¹ General Michael Short (USAF), for one, has extolled the virtues of a coalition of the willing with the United States at its head, as opposed to another war conducted by committee. Considering the Kosovo experience, he concluded: “It’s my evaluation that NATO cannot go to war in the air against a competent enemy without the U.S. If that is the case, and we are going to provide 70 percent of the effort—then we should have more than 1 of 19 votes.” What he thinks we should have said is, “We will take the alliance to war and we’re going to win this thing for you, but the price to be paid is we call the tune.”⁴² His is a minority view, but it underscores the strain between the American formula for effective action and Alliance dynamics.

This strain was eased in the response to September 11 by a tacit understanding that the United States would decide what military actions

it would take (with Britain the sole active allied partner) but would consult through Alliance channels as to its plans and operations. The historic invocation of article 5 did not give Washington a "blank check," as a number of member governments were quick to point out.

It still remains the intention of some allied governments (most notably the French) to make sure that they will have a greater say in the planning and execution of any future combined operations. This should be seen as a constant factor in the Alliance equation, deference to the American lead in the antiterrorist campaign notwithstanding. President Chirac was the most assertive of allied leaders in critiquing American plans, whether originating with General Clark or General Short, for a more extensive or more intensive air assault in Serbia proper. On several occasions, Chirac telephoned General Clark to protest what he saw as targeting decisions that ran counter to what he understood were agreed guidelines. He was especially irked by the independent line of decision that denied European governments any say in designating the missions for cruise missile and stealth bomber strikes. His general complaint that U.S. commanders were not sufficiently sensitive to the diplomatic aspects of the situation took on a sharper edge during the tense negotiations at the drama's end. Anxious that a diplomatically cornered Milosevic not retreat into obstinacy, Chirac urged a cessation of attacks on high-profile targets in and around Belgrade (as well as those in Montenegro). Renewed strikes against the Belgrade powergrid 36 hours later reminded him of both the limits of his influence and the very different judgments being reached by American leaders as to how Milosevic's mind worked.⁴³

A genuinely combined operation—that is, one in which the United States and allied governments share mission planning and execution—has the advantage of reducing the danger that any failure of consequence could lead to recrimination. Otherwise, were things to go badly, critics at home may well be inclined to blame the presumed shortcomings of allies, their misguided strategic ideas, or both. In any future conflict, the American strategy will continue to aim at reconciling the ambitious but conflicting objectives—"no compromise with ethnic cleansing" and casualty avoidance—by intensively using firepower, especially PGMs. Proponents of a German-style European strategy will face a mirror-image problem in trying to minimize both their own force casualties *and* civilian casualties from collateral damage. The only logical answer to that puzzle is to scale down military expectations while redoubling diplomatic efforts. On Kosovo, Germany could not do the

former, but it took full advantage of its position in holding the rotating EU presidency to press the latter. With conditions ripe for a new initiative and the allies agreed on the question of bringing in the Russians, Germany could act within its comfort zone and succeed.

Nonetheless, the inner tension that all allies experience about the conduct of peace-enforcing missions could handicap future operations. Allowance must be made for the particular sensibilities of each. Their complete reconciliation may be impossible. Still, the principle of full consultation prior to the initiation of military action should be observed to keep the risks of debilitating interallied frictions at tolerable levels. In this respect, the EU–NATO accords that provide for close coordination at all stages of the crisis management process are a significant accomplishment. Their refinement and implementation should be given priority. The United States should lend its full weight to the effort, cognizant that most allied governments expect that “Washington is serious about sharing the burden of crisis-management.”⁴⁴

Capabilities

ESDP will challenge the ability of the United States and its European allies to work in concert whether conducting coercive diplomacy, managing crises, or launching peace-enforcing operations. Their success in avoiding serious strains will be influenced, if not determined, by the degree of disparity in force capabilities. The commitment of EU members to strengthen capacity for force projection has been at the center of attention. Highlighted as the Headline Goal, it has become the litmus test of how dedicated the Europeans are about giving teeth to ESDP. The gap in PGMs and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C⁴I) is equally great and growing. European forces are falling further behind those of the United States in keeping up with the revolution in military affairs produced by the application of sophisticated new technologies to weaponry and communications. As General Naumann has depicted the worrisome state of affairs, “None of the steps taken to fill the gaps will enable European forces to act alone.” He argues for an urgent effort to develop the technologically advanced command and control structures and intelligence capabilities essential to field a credible expeditionary force.⁴⁵ The costs of bringing the projected ESDP force up to U.S. standards will be high, even if EU governments are able to draw on American technology via a more liberal export licensing policy and the full utilization of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) provisions for tapping NATO

assets. Simply pooling current national capabilities will not suffice, although some saving in defense spending would be realized from moves toward the denationalization of procurement practices and cross-national industrial mergers and joint development projects. Moreover, in some measure an unavoidable tradeoff exists between the financial requirements for building airlift and sealift capacity to make European forces more mobile, on the one hand, and requisite investments in PGMs and C⁴I, on the other.

The tally sheet to date indicates some progress toward meeting the Headline Goal. The process of constituting the envisaged forces and making the requisite adjustments in national force structures has been disciplined. EU governments established a working group on capability goals at the Feira summit in June 2000. This group set in motion a program for systematically reviewing present assets, estimating future needs, and devising a coordinated strategy for meeting them. Integral to its efforts was close coordination with NATO to ensure that its program of force enhancement would be “mutually reinforcing” of the Alliance DCI. The aim was to harmonize the existing NATO force planning with the ESDP project. The interim military committee worked with NATO experts in teams called the Helsinki Task Force.⁴⁶ Meeting under the French EU presidency during fall 2000, these teams began by identifying four crisis scenarios that served as the basis for designing force packages and specific requirements for constituting and deploying them. The four scenarios covered forceful separation of belligerent parties; conflict prevention; humanitarian aid; and evacuation of nationals from conflict situations. They provided benchmarks against which to measure the capabilities and suitability of existing forces and to identify gaps to be filled. At the initiative of France, a detailed catalogue of requisite items, the Helsinki Headline Catalogue, was drawn up.

The EU Military Committee organized itself in an ad hoc format, the Headline Goal Task Force, which brought together experts from national military establishments and members of the embryonic EU Military Staff. NATO planners joined them on several occasions to present complementary needs assessments to factor into the elaboration of the Force Catalogue. At the Capabilities Commitment Conference meeting in Brussels in November 2000, participating governments identified assets that they had to contribute or the means to collaborate in developing them. Based on that inventory survey, the conference focused on existing deficiencies and drafted an action program for dealing with them. The plan covers the restructuring of existing forces,

methods for pooling national resources (including technological ones), and the formation and financing of joint development projects.

The Conference was occasion to emphasize progress made and to register pledges by the EU 15 earmarked for ESDP operations. (Non-EU NATO members and candidate members also offered pledges; the Turkish pledge was the most substantial.) The ensuing Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration (MCCD) listed an impressive array of pledged contributions set out in the Force Catalogue.⁴⁷ In quantitative terms, they constituted a manpower pool of 100,000 ready for deployment, backed by a total of 600 combat aircraft and 100 naval vessels. Each of the four largest EU countries—Britain, France, Germany, and Italy—pledged forces accounting for at least 15 percent of the total. The aggregate was deemed sufficient to “make it possible to satisfy the needs identified to carry out the different types of crisis management missions within the Headline Goal.”⁴⁸ By June 2001, the European Union was prepared to announce an “Initial Operating Capability” to deploy a force of 20,000 without relying on NATO assets by the end of the year.

This goal may be overly optimistic; to meet the objective of keeping the full rapid reaction force of 60,000 in the field for a year, the pool of qualified personnel would have to be closer to 200,000 than the 100,000 pledged. Also, the means to move and supply the force and equipment are not yet available. MCCD recognizes the critical need to increase strategic mobility. It cites a number of projects under way or planned that will meet that need. Seven European countries are committed to acquire approximately 185 A400M transport aircraft, the military version of Airbus. Britain has announced procurement plans for C-17 aircraft. A similar investment in sea transport vessels—including roll-on, roll-off amphibious ships and troop transport helicopters—should bolster overall projection capability. These planned acquisitions presuppose a broad-based reversal of the trend toward downsizing European military forces and at least a slight increase in defense budgets.

A NATO report card of December 2000 that graded progress toward reaching the goals laid down in DCI cited 11 out of 15 European members as committed to real increases in defense spending in their 2001 budgets.⁴⁹ That projection proved to be overly optimistic; only six actually appropriated more money for defense, while five others had stabilized spending after years of a steady decline. Overall, the defense budgets of the 15 have been static since 1997. In constant dollar terms,

they have declined by 5 percent per annum, but that figure is distorted by the 15 percent decline of the Euro vis-à-vis the dollar. Merely keeping the spending level may not provide sufficient funding to achieve the augmentation and upgrading of European capabilities in the critical areas of force projection, PGMs, and C⁴I. Germany is of cardinal importance in this regard. Its program of restructure and reform aims at raising the number of well-trained operation forces (*Einsatzkräfte*) from 50,000 to 150,000. Available on a rotational basis, they would be a central component of the EU rapid reaction corps. Present financing, though, is inadequate to reach those objectives. Currently, fully operational forces are barely adequate to meet Balkan deployments.⁵⁰

The Schroeder government deflated hopes for streamlining the German armed forces by cutting defense spending by 1.4 percent in its fiscal year 2002 budget. It placed Berlin, and especially Defense Secretary Scharping, in the embarrassing position of being unable to finance Germany's substantial share of the nine-nation A400M transport aircraft project. In the absence of a direct budgetary allocation, officials scrambled to find a formula that would keep its participation in the program alive. The deferred payment deal eventually agreed upon has kept the project afloat, though not without adding to strains with France, which feared the negative repercussions for reaching ESDP goals. Moreover, it has cast a shadow over EU plans to close the capability gap through ambitious multinational weapons programs.⁵¹ The designers of ESDP are paying close attention to the uncertain prospects for augmentation of German forces and the shortfalls of other EU states. An evaluation mechanism approved at the Nice European Council enables a systematic follow-up and assessment of progress made in meeting pledges and force goals. It operates in tandem with a counterpart NATO evaluation program, relying on technical data generated by the Defense Planning Process and the Planning and Review Process.⁵² A highlighted issue, and one that will not be readily resolved, has been the competing claims on limited defense funds of augmented projection capability and the upgrading of technologically advanced weapons. Stringent budgetary conditions are not likely to be eased any time soon, in part because of the Economic and Monetary Union. The growth and stability pact that undergirds EMU sets strict ceilings on permissible budget deficits. As such, it has perpetuated the fiscal austerity required by the convergence criteria. The pickup in growth rates over the past 2 years has created some room for increased expenditures. However, priority is accorded the claims of electoral constituencies keen to ease the social and political

pressures created by the curtailment of civilian programs, especially welfare and pension programs. Present forecasts indicate that little if anything will be left over for hikes in defense spending. A slowdown in growth rates could quickly endanger them altogether.

Some qualitative improvement of European capabilities in areas of advanced military technology is under way. Britain and France are expanding their inventory of PGMs; the Euro-fighter will be equipped with new air-to-air missiles; the Netherlands has led a program by five European countries with F-16 aircraft to purchase PGMs on a multinational basis; Germany, after long equivocation, has agreed to invest in the French-led Helios II optical satellite; and several countries are upgrading their communications. The scope and pace of progress remain unclear. Improvements will not be uniform from country to country or across the span of capabilities.

However, continued enhancement of U.S. capabilities means that whatever absolute gains the European allies achieve, differentials will remain or even widen. The prospect that such capability gaps between American and allied armed forces may not narrow markedly has troublesome implications. The first is that interoperability on the battlefield could be jeopardized. Fully integrated combined operations will prove more difficult. A de facto division of labor might result whereby the United States performs missions that rely on PGMs and high-tech communications, while its allies are restricted to conducting more basic military tasks. An alliance in which Europeans are relegated to the military equivalent of unskilled laborers will suffer a loss of cohesion and create the kind of strains that surfaced during Operation *Allied Force*. A corollary effect is that the United States will come under pressure to join in operations that it might otherwise stay out of because its weaponry is indispensable for doing the job at tolerable risk.

The second potential implication is that the projected European force will be restricted in the missions that it can undertake to one end of the conflict spectrum—that is, essentially, the Petersburg tasks. That limitation may well cover the most likely contingencies in Europe, but it problematizes a Europe-only operation even closely equivalent to *Allied Force*, much less the ground assault that was being contemplated. Ally contribution to a serious challenge outside of Europe would be similarly limited. Although envisaging scenarios in the latter category from which the United States would abstain is difficult, the nettlesome issue of roles in a division of labor could be aggravated. The net effect

would be an exacerbation of transatlantic tensions over how to reequilibrate the Alliance.

Marked qualitative differences in advanced weaponry also can spawn political problems. Disputes over the use of depleted uranium shells turned on judgments as to what level of health risk should be tolerated for the sake of enhanced effectiveness. The lines were quickly drawn between those who had the weapons in their arsenal (America and Britain) and those who did not (Germany, Italy, and Belgium, among others). The calls for a moratorium, if not an outright ban, that came from the latter group polarized the Alliance. The technical issue of weapon health risks was implicitly tied to the question of American prerogatives in determining what weapons are needed and should be available in the Alliance arsenal.

Critical public opinion on the continent was bolstered, and Alliance disagreement was underscored by EU entry into the fray. The Political and Security Committee addressed the issue and inaugurated an expert review of the safety question. They were encouraged to take action by European Commission President Romano Prodi, who urged that depleted uranium munitions be banned. The EU Parliament seconded Prodi in passing a resolution by near unanimity that recommended an indefinite suspension of the use of the weapons until their safety had been established through exhaustive testing. All of the study panels concluded that in fact the use of depleted uranium shells posed no apparent health hazard to troops in the field. Even so, the activation of EU bodies to debate a matter arising from NATO military action is indicative of the politically sensitive environment in which contentious issues of a quasi-security kind will be considered in the future.

Full parity between the United States and its European allies is neither realistic nor an appropriate goal. Expanding the functional range of European aggregate forces is important, however, for it can determine what feasible options exist for distributing responsibilities and assigning roles in dealing with security problems in Europe. It is also a precondition for extending their strategic partnership into other regions.

EU–NATO Cooperation

Bolstering European military capabilities is the precondition for realizing the potential of ESDP. Reaping its full benefits to a healthy Euro-American strategic partnership will require a joining of the embryonic EU structures with the established NATO infrastructure. The harmonization of the two is not a straightforward exercise in architectural engineering, though. It entails linking two institutions that have distinct constitutions, modes of operation, and approaches to collective decisionmaking. Moreover, since ESDP is integral to a multidimensional building process, it carries a meaning and significance that goes beyond its stipulated task-specific objectives.

From the moment that the idea of an ESDI associated within the European Union was resuscitated at St. Malo, American policymakers were worried by the prospect of an independent entity that could weaken the unity of NATO and challenge its preeminence. That concern was a constant in the ongoing, and intense, diplomacy of the ensuing 2 years that culminated in December 2000. Together, the EU Council summit at Nice, sandwiched between the NAC meetings in Defense Ministers and Foreign Ministers session, sealed a complex set of agreements that conferred status on ESDP while linking it closely to NATO structures. The terms of association between NATO and the new EU security bodies represent a Euro-American bargain. The United States acknowledges that the European Union has autonomy in decisionmaking; that the Union and NATO are “organizations of a different nature”; that these differences “will be taken into account in the arrangements concerning their relations”; and that “each organization will be dealing with the other on an equal footing.”⁵³ Washington also accepts and respects (with, however, little enthusiasm) the validity and potential utility of the organizational infrastructure that accompanies the buildup of military capabilities. In return, the United States has demanded and won

European acceptance of interlocking structures and intersecting procedures between the two organizations and EU reliance on NATO assets (tangible and intangible) for the foreseeable future. The functional independence of ESDP is circumscribed in all respects by enmeshing it in a dense network of coordinated arrangements. That EU concession was exchanged for firm assurances that it will have guaranteed access to NATO assets for conjectured EU-led operations. This reconciliation reins in more ambitious conceptions of ESDP even as it places the Alliance seal of approval on the European enterprise. The precise specification of how the two organizations will relate to each other notwithstanding, the evolutionary path and ultimate destination of ESDP is not within Washington's control. The issue of European defense will continue to demand close, sustained attention.

The diplomatic process that produced the December 2000 accords was a shaky one. It reveals the recurrent points of contention and highlights the different interpretations of key terms such as *autonomy* and *NATO primacy*, which bedeviled well-intentioned attempts to vitalize and accommodate ESDP. That process began at St. Malo, where attention was refocused on how a European defense entity would be related to NATO. The declaration left unresolved questions as to the status of the CJTF accords that had been negotiated so laboriously and whose procedures were still being elaborated. The British moved quickly to reassure the United States that nothing in the new concept called into question NATO primacy or the principle of "separable but not separate" forces that was at the core of the Berlin agreement. The French stressed the new departure represented by ESDP while making a ritual bow to NATO. The Clinton administration sought to secure the essence of the Combined Joint Task Forces while protecting NATO from the sort of jurisdictional challenge that had been warded off in the early 1990s. The three famous red lines it laid down encapsulated the essence of the American position.

The Washington summit seemed to register an American diplomatic success. The communiqué underscored that "effective mutual consultation, cooperation, and transparency" between NATO and the European Union would "avoid unnecessary duplication" while "ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European allies in EU-led operations." It declared NATO readiness to "define and adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance," in a manner that

would “respect . . . the coherence of the command structure.”⁵⁴ Four principles were enunciated:

1. assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations
2. the presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations
3. identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations, further developing the role of Deputy SACEUR [DSACEUR] in order for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities
4. the further adaptation of NATO's defence planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations.⁵⁵

Differences in interpreting and applying those principles soon surfaced. Nuanced differences in wording in the Washington summit communiqué and the Cologne Declaration revealed differences in conception. The Clinton administration was so vexed by discrepancies in the communiqués that it vigorously protested. The points in contention were summarized in a “Sins of Cologne” memorandum, prepared by the State Department, that compared wording of the two declarations. One concern was that the Cologne Declaration implied a division of labor whereby the NATO role would be restricted to collective defense (article 5 contingencies), while the European Union would “contribute to the vitality of a renewed Alliance” by assuming a more “effective role . . . in conflict prevention and crisis management” (article 4 contingencies). A second concern was the blurring of the principle of NATO right to “first refusal.” The Washington Declaration was explicit that the EU capacity for autonomous action be activated only on condition that NATO as an institution had decided not to act. The Cologne language used the looser phrase “without prejudice to action by NATO.” Third, Cologne treated an EU operation relying entirely on its own resources on a co-equal basis with EU-led operations using NATO assets in conformity with CJTF arrangements. In the American view, a fully autonomous operation should not be considered so long as the CJTF option was viable.

The American campaign was largely successful, thanks in part to British efforts to craft formulations that allayed American anxieties. The subsequent Helsinki Declaration was most explicit in pledging that

non-EU members would be enabled to participate in any EU-led operation. Also, it reverted to the language of the Washington Declaration that a European force only would be activated “when NATO as a whole was not engaged.” In addition, the word *autonomous* was clarified to make explicit that the reference was to the envisaged ESDP decisionmaking organs and should not be interpreted as implying a desire to acquire assets that would duplicate those of NATO. Helsinki retained the option of an autonomous EU operation on a par with a CJTF structured operation. This option would be reiterated at Nice. At the institutional level, the Union remained resolute in its commitment to creating the institutional apparatus for ESDP. Clinton administration uneasiness about the Union endowing itself with the full panoply of organizational assets for a security policy reflected a concern that the latent influence the United States kept under the terms of the CJTF arrangements would be seriously weakened. That concern was even stronger in Congress.

Parallel Senate and House resolutions were passed in November 1999 that stated in the strongest language that Congress supported a European Security and Defense Identity so long as the European allies explicitly recognized continued NATO primacy and devoted themselves to meeting the objectives laid out in the Defense Capabilities Initiative.⁵⁶ The aim of the resolution sponsors—Representatives Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) and Douglas Bereuter (R-NE) and Senator William Roth (R-DE)—was twofold: to rally supporters of a continued U.S. commitment to an active role in European security matters behind an Atlanticist version of a new EU initiative and to warn the West Europeans that backing for their enterprise was contingent on their observing the 3D redlines and that to transgress them would strengthen the hand of those who preferred a policy of selective unilateralism to modified forms of Alliance multilateralism.

The intensity of Congressional feelings about the projected ESDP was driven home to allied governments who responded with a concerted campaign to explain and reassure. Capitol Hill became an obligatory stop on the schedule of European officials visiting Washington. The allies succeeded in neutralizing opposition to the EU defense initiative, but they retained a sense of uneasiness about Congress establishing itself as an independent actor in transatlantic diplomacy. They were especially troubled by the widespread view that the United States should devolve full responsibility for peacekeeping missions in Europe onto its allies. The latter worry deepened in reaction to remarks

by members of the Bush foreign policy team that it was time for a new Alliance division of labor.

Reconciling Structures

Possible modification of the Combined Joint Task Forces and related arrangements was the subject of extensive negotiations between NATO and the European Union. Begun informally at the Permanent Representative level in early 2000, French objections that EU states should first reach consensus on the ESDP structural format prevented them from acquiring official status until the EU Council at Santa Maria da Feira in June 2000 agreed on a set of principles to guide consultations on developing modalities for EU–NATO coordination. They stressed each organization's distinct identity and equality. The principles amounted to a declaration that EU supercedence of the WEU represented a qualitative change in the status of the European party to the Berlin accords. The United States had a somewhat different perspective. On the key question of asset transfer, the American preference was to retain the Berlin accords and the specific provisions flowing from them essentially intact—substituting *EU* for *WEU* in the documents. The American aim throughout has been to keep SACEUR and SHAPE in the picture after activation of the CJTF provisions. Taking a lenient attitude toward making available planning and headquarters assets, whose transfer is “assured,” Washington has sought to keep some element of discretion about the *presumed* transfer of other *hard* assets.

The problem for American policymakers was to avoid insisting on so strict a set of conditions as to encourage European allies to seek maximum autonomy, even if that meant investing in the “duplication” of NATO (that is, U.S.) assets while concurrently withholding its approval of a “help yourself” policy toward asset transfer.

Not surprisingly, the ground rules for NATO–EU cooperation became the subject of intense bargaining. At Feira, four ad hoc working groups were created. The goal was agreement on a permanent set of arrangements to be ratified along with the ESDP permanent structures at the end of the year.⁵⁷ The first group was charged with putting together a set of provisions that would be the basis for a formal EU–NATO security agreement. It covered, inter alia, information exchanges and access for EU officials to NATO planning structures. The second group, focused on capability goals, was mindful of the need to enter into consultation with NATO officials to ensure that the EU program of force enhancement would be “mutually reinforcing” of

Alliance plans to implement DCI. The third ad hoc working group tackled the critical issue of EU access to NATO assets. The fourth was to draft a code of procedures to lay down a permanent set of arrangements for across-the-board EU–NATO consultation and coordination on the principles stated in the presidency report on the Feira summit.

The prickly issue of what place non-EU NATO members would have in EU military crisis management proved most resistant to resolution. Turkish sensibilities about possible marginalization on matters of European security, its status deprivation vis-à-vis ESDP, have remained acute. The United States has held to its firm position on nondiscrimination, urging the Union to accommodate what it deemed legitimate Turkish concerns. European governments, at first reluctant to compromise the organizational integrity of the Union, modified their position substantially. At the Feira summit, they introduced articles designed to satisfy Turkish demands into the provisional charter establishing ESDP bodies. EU governments were eager to prevent the dispute from aggravating already tender relations with Ankara, to which they extended candidate member status with the greatest reluctance. Moreover, they were properly apprehensive that an estranged, embittered Turkey could obstruct efforts to conclude an EU–NATO agreement on the terms of access to Alliance assets.

The proposed modes of consultation and coordination between EU bodies and third parties incorporated into the Nice accords allow for the participation of all NATO states who are Union members to participate in EU-led crisis management operations. They would have equal rights in the design and direction of military actions per se. In addition, they are guaranteed consultation as a matter of course when an ESDP body considers a problem that falls within their sphere of strategic interest. In the latter circumstances, they are invited to contribute to forming policy initiatives. These provisions are comprehensive and highly detailed. The Nice accords contain an entire annex devoted to “Arrangements Concerning non-EU European NATO Members and Other Countries Which are Candidates for Accession to the EU.” They stipulate an elaborate set of concrete provisions covering the routine pre-operational and operational phase of crisis management, including: “a single inclusive structure in which all the countries concerned can enjoy the necessary dialogue, consultation, and cooperation with the EU”; two meetings in the EU+15 format on ESDP matters during each (6-month) presidency; and a ministerial level meeting in each presidency in the 15+6 format. In the routine phase of a crisis, regular meetings in the

EU+15 format, along with at least two meetings in the 15+6 format, will occur. At the operational level, the provisions are somewhat less precise. The relevant clause reads: "Upon a decision by the Council to launch an operation, the non-EU European NATO members will participate if they so wish, in the event of an operation requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. They will, on a decision by the Council, be invited to take part in operations where the EU does not use NATO assets."⁵⁸

Turkey took a dim view of the discretionary element that the Council has granted itself in the latter contingency. Ankara drew an unfavorable comparison between the qualified rights that it has under the ESDP design and those it was given as an associate partner of WEU. The latter allowed Turkey to initiate matters for consideration and make proposals for collective action. It now sees itself as a fringe participant that will be briefed but not consulted and that will be invited to participate in predefined missions rather than taking part in decisionmaking about form and function. As the Turkish ambassador to NATO, Onur Oymen, bluntly put it, "Consultation means nothing. We should have the right to take part, in the real sense of the word, from planning to implementation to strategic command and control."⁵⁹ The resulting acrimony spurred some EU governments to ask the Clinton administration to intercede by reassuring Turkey that the Nice plan was a reasonable one that went as far as the European Union could, short of granting Turkey full membership rights. Washington had spurned an earlier request in the wake of Feira because it believed that the Union could go further. By December, it was persuaded, and it sought to persuade the Turks that the proposed terms of reconciliation were as sufficient. The words of the lame-duck Clinton administration were not compelling to Ankara. While Turkey withdrew its veto preventing NATO experts from cooperating with their EU counterparts on the ESDP Military Committee in refining force requirements, it remained adamant that the codification of CJTF provisions for EU access to NATO assets, including planning units and headquarters, would not move forward until its grievances had been addressed satisfactorily. Turkey came under strong diplomatic pressure by the Bush administration and the British government at the NATO foreign ministerial meeting in May 2001. In exchange for EU pledges to increase the frequency and scope of consultation, Ankara was urged to accept the terms of the asset transfer agreement worked out the previous December. An accord to remove the last stumbling block to the conclusion of a final EU–NATO security agreement remained elusive, however.

Sharing Assets

The intense diplomacy that surrounded the NATO and EU summits in December 2000 succeeded in establishing a framework for cooperation between the two organizations. The most critical of many tense moments pitted the United States, which was dedicated to preventing the fledgling European defense institutions from developing separately from NATO, against France, which wanted to develop independent facilities ensuring that the Union retained the power to evaluate situations and plan and launch missions in which NATO was not organizationally involved. Washington sought ironclad commitment to arrangements leaving no ambiguity that force and operational planning capabilities remained with NATO; that there be complete and open communication in the consideration of any matters that might lead to an EU request to use Alliance assets; and that the Union “take a flexible and generous approach to participation by non-EU allies”—that is, Turkey. In exchange, the United States reiterated its pledge of “assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities and the presumption of availability to the EU of pre-defined . . . assets.”⁶⁰

The question of planning capabilities emerged as the sharpest point of contention. A strongly worded address by Secretary of Defense William Cohen at the NATO defense ministerial meeting triggered a mini-crisis. He warned that “NATO was in danger of becoming a relic” unless the European Union abandoned the idea of building a separate planning apparatus that “would be in competition with rather being a complement to NATO itself.”⁶¹ To avoid “inconsistencies between the military standards and requirements of the two organizations,” Cohen proposed a common planning process involving all 23 NATO or EU countries “as the only logical cost-effective way to ensure the best possible coordination of limited forces and resources.”⁶²

The strong American campaign was set off by what Washington officials interpreted as a French-inspired design to create a rival planning unit to guide ESDP programs and operations. France indeed had depicted EUMS and EUMC as bodies capable of planning not only small-scale humanitarian missions but also perhaps medium-size operations. Deciding who would plan what would be approached on a case-by-case basis. The French conception of the 100-strong military staff is more ambitious than the British idea. In pointed public exchanges between London and Paris on the eve of the Nice summit, British Minister of Defense Geoff Hoon pictured EUMS as “intelligent consum-

ers” of the NATO planning product who thereby would be positioned to provide “strategic guidance” to the PSC.⁶³ The EU documents, while worded loosely enough to allow differing interpretations, do in fact sketch a military bureaucracy able to facilitate the application of NATO plans to EU missions by adapting the plans according to their best judgment and generating their own ideas.

French officials do not conceal their conviction that the Union should be equipped with “the capabilities for analyzing crisis situations, to search for solutions through all types of action, including military ones, and to be able to employ these means” if it is to fulfill the obligations the ESDP bestows on it.⁶⁴ Defense Minister Alain Richard responded to Secretary Cohen’s strong remarks by noting, “We certainly have a different view of planning” even as “we appreciate the size and capacities of the planning assets that exist in NATO.”⁶⁵ Contrasting the emerging ESDP apparatus with allegedly rigid NATO structures, Richard has stressed that EU institutions “will permit a tighter control by national governments than in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. In particular, the pivotal role given the military committee ought to involve them in the formulation of strategic decisions and in the planning of operations.” Autonomous planning capabilities are especially attractive to France since it “is not integrated into the planning apparatus and integrated command of the Alliance.”⁶⁶

France was forced to cede ground on the planning issue. It had to accept the consensual view of its partners that a challenge to the American position was not called for. The Final Communiqué of the NAC Ministerial Meeting has remained close to the American line on all aspects of EU–NATO linkage. It specified a comprehensive set of arrangements (most of which already had been laid out in the documents approved at Nice the preceding week) that was ready to be codified into a final framework agreement once Turkish recalcitrance was worn down. The NAC communiqué made clear that assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities would be integral to the military planning of EU-led operations, and it looked ahead to “the further adaptation of the Alliance defence planning systems [to take] account of relevant activities in and proposals from the EU” and it specified “procedures to be followed for the EU to access pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets.” The stipulation is made that the “Allies will be consulted on the EU’s proposed use of assets and capabilities, prior to the decision to release” and will be “kept informed during the operation.”⁶⁷ As to command arrangements, provisions are made for the

“identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations, further developing the role of DSACEUR in order for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities.”⁶⁸

These agreements in principle have not laid to rest the question of self-sufficient European operational planning units and command headquarters. The French continue to press the argument that existing national facilities could be upgraded to conduct operations involving 20,000 or more troops (the size of the NATO force in Bosnia as of 2001). The two most capable headquarters are the British Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) located in an underground bunker northwest of London and a similar facility beneath the French Defense Ministry in Paris. British officials already are working on provisional arrangements to incorporate military personnel from other EU countries to plan and direct an operation out of PJHQ. Its capability for running a significant operation was demonstrated in autumn 2001, when Britain directed an exercise in Oman involving 24,000 fully equipped troops.⁶⁹ The British and French motivations for studying the possible utility of national headquarters for ESDP operations differ. France clearly prefers to keep as much distance between EU bodies and NATO as is practical and diplomatically feasible. Britain is acting pragmatically to develop whatever assets are available for conducting operations under a number of contingent circumstances, without preference for independent EU capabilities. That the most Atlanticist of American allies should have this attitude is a sign of more fluid Alliance conditions. Now that there no longer is a presumption that European security matters will be treated within NATO, with active U.S. participation, allied governments will be attentive to what they can do on their own and how. This focus should not be interpreted as a devaluing of established Alliance arrangements and procedures; rather, it reflects the evolutionary path marked out by the initial Berlin accords on the Combined Joint Task Forces.

Whatever the eventual disposition of autonomous ESDP planning capabilities, the essence of the agreement between NATO and the EU—agreed by the United States—remains intact. It represents a deal whereby a concession of relatively liberal terms of EU access to all Alliance assets are matched by an EU commitment in turn “to intensify consultation in times of crisis.” An intricate pattern of consultation and joint meetings is agreed. It achieves the American objective of ensuring that the legal autonomy of ESDP institutions in practice does not lead to, or even allow for, a separate process of deliberation and decision. The Final Communiqué proclaims the EU–NATO dialogue “should be

pursued . . . in full transparency, consultation, and cooperation.” Although the new EU security structures appear tightly circumscribed, the Presidency Conclusions on ESDP attached to the Nice Council Declaration draw the portrait of institutions with broad scope and extensive authority. The Political and Security Committee, characterized as “the linchpin of the European security and defence policy,” is accorded an impressive list of functions. In addition to its “central role . . . in the definition of and follow-up to the EU’s response to a crisis,” the committee was tasked to

- send guidelines to the military committee
- lead the political dialogue
- take responsibility for the political direction of the development of military capabilities, under the auspices of the Council, taking into account the type of crisis
- deal with crisis situations and examine all the options that might be considered as the Union’s response.⁷⁰

The military committee is envisioned as working in partnership with the PSC. It is served by the military staff. The chief of the EUMC is a four-star flag officer; the head of EUMS a three-star flag officer.⁷¹ German General Rainer Schuwirth has been appointed to the latter position; British General Graham Messervy-Whiting is his deputy. Their combined functions include “the risk assessment of potential crises, to draw up and present strategic military options . . . to provide early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for the Petersburg tasks.”⁷² The EUMC and EUMS are enjoined to ensure compatibility with NATO “as far as possible.” These are substantial responsibilities. In effect, the European Union has equipped itself with the infrastructure that, if fully developed, would enable it to act with a high degree of independence from NATO. Current intentions and overall capabilities place that prospect well into the future. Still, these organizational assets are an indication of the dedication to ESDP and the new EU security vocation in general.

Taken together, the NATO Final Communiqué and the EU Council Presidency Conclusions closely bind the two organizations. Those ties address indirectly the fundamental question of when and how the Union becomes involved in the handling of a security problem. When a crisis poses the question of military action immediately or in the near term, a reasonable expectation now exists that deliberations on whether, when, and how armed force should be deployed be reserved for

NATO. The difficulty in making that proposition universal and absolute is that such a clear-cut case may be the exception. The Balkan crises of the 1990s certainly did not fit that specification. (The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, by contrast, did.) Even in situations where NATO is given the primary responsibility, the PSC may meet for consultation and possible declaratory action given the pronounced institutional identity of the Union and expansive sense of its responsibilities despite the overlap in the membership of the two organizations and their dedication to coordination. Differing viewpoints conceivably could emerge between an EU majority position and the United States that would have to be composed or accommodated, which would occur through deliberative processes that are transparent to other governments and to European publics, too, in accordance with the procedural guidelines agreed at Nice. The EU Council, Parliament, Commission and the peoples they represent cannot realistically be expected simply to step out of the way. In all likelihood, the European Union will be a player “willy-nilly,” which may well complicate either the mounting of a concerted diplomacy or a smooth division of labor. That may even be so when military operations are being planned or threatened. A case therefore can be made for the United States seeking to marginalize the PSC, and the European Council, in such a crisis situation. Can it reasonably expect to do so?

Probably not—for two reasons. First, a serious attempt by the United States to preempt the European Union presupposes a clear judgment that America has a stake important enough to justify taking control of Alliance policy and has a decided view as to the preferred course of action. Such cases are liable to be rare, however, and carry with them a domestic political priority to keep the allies engaged, which could be imperiled by damaging EU institutions, whether intentional. Second, some crises are liable to evolve over time. In a given instance, potentially serious ramifications may be foreseeable, but the appropriate means for effective crisis management may not be obvious or the will to act too weak (for example, the early phase of the conflicts of the former Yugoslavia, circa 1991). Conditions of latent or low-grade conflict can continue for a considerable time, during which the European Union will be doing its perceived duty by taking responsible measures to dampen or eliminate the combustible elements, as it has sought to do in Macedonia. The point of crossing the imaginary line between latent or minor conflict, on the one hand, and conflict of manifestly major consequence, on the other, may not be obvious. In the earlier phases, the Union will

have deployed an array of soft measures aimed at conflict prevention. The PSC is slated to play the key role in integrating the diverse means available into a coherent strategy and in directing its implementation.

Consequently, the United States can best ensure its influence by being diplomatically engaged and in constant contact with its European allies. Arrangements agreed at the December 2000 summits are designed to interlace EU and NATO deliberations and actions in crisis management. The processes outlined in fine detail in the pertinent EU–NATO documents have the advantage of curtailing EU autonomy. Their disadvantage is a stifling proceduralism better suited to preventing decisive action than facilitating it. An alternative is informal mechanisms that do not raise prickly issues of organizational jurisdiction and precedence. The setup that brings together the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy for regular consultation and coordination in dealing with Kosovo and Yugoslavia post-Operation *Allied Force* offers one model. Concerts of this kind, which have included Russia and could continue to do so, are convenient and diplomatically cost effective. They are not a substitute for authoritative, collective action by more formal bodies. But they can be useful in avoiding cumbersome procedures as well as shaping and giving impetus to more encompassing forms of political and economic action. They also can shape and give political impetus to more formal actions taken by either NATO or the European Union. The main impediment to activating such informal concerts will be prior EU engagement; the Union is a rule-bound organization with all the nimbleness of a supertanker. Once under way, it cannot easily be turned back to port or even set on a new course.

The principle that a constant American presence is essential is incontestable, as was shown during the unfolding Kosovo crisis. Washington had learned in Bosnia the harsh lesson that abstention is costly. Sustained involvement facilitates the shift into a military mode with NATO coming to the fore. However, the new EU security bodies cannot reasonably be expected to cease and desist from convening. Realistically, in a multifaceted conflict situation, the Union will be engaged in some way at various stages in the crisis for functional as well as geographical reasons. As EU leaders never tire of reminding Washington (and themselves), ESDP is part of a larger engagement by the Union to promote stability and progress across the continent.

That engagement was evident in the alacrity with which the Union interjected itself into the Macedonian crisis in March 2001.⁷³ Armed Albanian ultranationalists, the self-styled National Liberation

Army (NLA) from Kosovo, sought to foment secessionist sentiment among the disaffected Albanian community in Macedonia. It provoked a sharp military response by the Skopje government that threatened to upset the country's fragile ethnic equilibrium. EU governments moved swiftly in dispatching Javier Solana to counsel prudence to Macedonian authorities while placing the full weight of the Union behind efforts to build a consensus among the major political formations, thereby isolating the rebels. Over the ensuing months, Solana became point man for a concerted campaign to broker an accord while preventing the spread of armed conflict. The campaign was bolstered by the inducement of closer ties with the European Union via a stabilization and association agreement that held out the prospect of eventual membership for Macedonia.

Solana's intermediation was complemented by the involvement of NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson. They worked in tandem, as did their respective organizations. NATO forces in Kosovo stepped up efforts to seal the Kosovo-Macedonian border, a crucial element in the strategy for quieting the crisis. The United States took a low profile. The deliberate decision to yield the lead to actors conformed to the newly installed Bush administration conception of what the Euro-American division of labor should be. No high-level American envoys shuttled into Skopje, nor was an American plan energetically promoted to resolve the problem. Washington also ruled out the participation of American troops in any conjectured peacekeeping force for Macedonia. That reticence notwithstanding, the United States exerted its influence behind the scenes in support of the EU initiatives.

How the Macedonian crisis was handled did not touch directly the most sensitive issues of how ESDP and NATO should relate to each other. It is noteworthy, nonetheless, on four counts. First, it showed that EU governments are taking seriously their self-defined role as custodian of political stability in southeastern Europe. Their unhesitant intercession, in striking contrast to their behavior in the early 1990s, gave credence to pledges in both the Amsterdam and Nice Declarations to act as one to deal with security challengers. Second, the newly created ESDP apparatus was employed to formulate a common approach and to concert diplomacy. Solana, in his role as High Representative of the Council, was the agent for a unified, activist policy. In so doing, he had the cooperation of Chris Patten, the Commissioner for External Relations, with whom he formed an effective partnership. Third, the potential for turbulence among Washington, European governments, and

the multinational organizations through which they acted again was evident. Finally, the contribution of NATO and the United States notwithstanding, the Union established itself as the primary agent for the West in the Macedonia crisis.

Form, Function, and Culture

The European Union is destined to be part of the picture whenever security problems arise in Europe. The rhetorical primacy accorded NATO should not be read as relegating the EU structures to some sort of back-up role. EU member governments realistically can be expected to acquire the habit of deliberating among themselves on a broad range of matters. The intermingling of NATO and EU committee personnel lowers the risk that conclaves of the allies meeting under ESDP auspices will formulate policies and take decisions without the full knowledge of the United States. Yet the avowed U.S. interest of the ESDP in becoming militarily competent by meeting its Headline Goal in practice cannot be separated from the maturation of its civilian structures and consultative procedures. The sense of a common security identity and the sufficient will to act, which are crucial to making strengthened forces credible, are also the ingredients for the conduct of an active CFSP.

ESDP is but one dimension of the Union Common and Foreign and Security Policy. Solana's two roles as High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Director-General of the Council's secretariat exemplify that overlap. The PSC, which he chairs, has as one of its functions the steering of the CFSP. The Committee, composed of permanent representatives at ambassadorial rank, by its very existence will foster a collective European ethos and will encourage an early, active involvement of the Union in dealing with nascent, or even latent, European security problems.⁷⁴ The debate about the precise ESDP terms of connection with NATO and the United States has concentrated on defense. However, the Helsinki agreements, as explained in the Presidency Conclusions, cover "major political issues." Indeed, one of Solana's tasks is to contribute to Council deliberations by identifying "foreign and security policy matters" that deserve the attention of the PSC or the ministerial Council and to present alternative courses for its consideration. In a sense, he can be visualized as a national security advisor serving a plural executive.

The responsibilities of the High Representative cum Secretary General of the Council overlap those of the Commissioner for External

Relations, Chris Patten. Considerable potential exists for friction and mutual interference. Only in the strictly military area is it clear that the Commission has no competence and no ambition. On all other matters that fall under the general heading of security, it has the legal authority, the means, and the practice to act in the name of the Union. The Treaty on European Union (TEU), as amended at Amsterdam, states that the High Representative "shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the CFSP . . . through contributing to the formulation, preparation, and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate, acting on behalf of the Council."⁷⁵ The Nice accords expand those powers. But they do not explicitly alter the overlapping of responsibilities the High Representative shares with the Commissioner for External Relations.

Patten's conception of his role is as wide-ranging as is his reading of the Cologne and Helsinki Declarations is broad. It conforms with the ambitious conception of the European Union as a global actor advanced by France, among others. He has boldly proclaimed that "When EU governments sign treaties proclaiming a common foreign policy to match the common market and economic and monetary union, they are staking a claim for an effective presence in international affairs, and they are stating this claim to politicians and policymakers throughout the world."⁷⁶ That presence is vital for Europe to become "a serious counterweight to the United States."⁷⁷ As Patten stated frankly in a speech at the French Institute of International Relations, Europe's mission is to "project stability" by exercising a sobering influence on a United States that more and more acts as a maverick with little regard for the thinking and concerns of others—including its European partners. Europe's approach to security is not identical with that of the United States, even if they share a basic set of interests. However, the Union is not prepared for this challenge. It is handicapped by "lousy procedures," a category that includes "some new institutional complications" created by the appointment of Solana as High Representative.⁷⁸

Patten's blunt remarks were aimed at both Washington and EU governments. To the United States, his message was: Curb your impulse toward unilateralism, and treat Europe as a respected partner. To EU governments, Patten was laying down a double challenge. He was alerting them that he took seriously his duty to "act as a reality check" on common foreign and security initiatives that "too often languish for lack of political follow-up or funding."⁷⁹ He also was calling attention to the Commission's substantial CFSP obligations, which were not

vitiated by the appointment of Solana and the setting up of the Council ESDP apparatus. Under the terms of the TEU as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Commissioner for External Relations is expected to follow "the principles . . . and general guidelines" defined by the Council. The Council "shall also decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union," which embraces the Commission.⁸⁰ The Commissioner in this sense derives his authority from the Council as does the High Representative. However, in both EU law and practice, the Commissioner, as well as the High Representative, has a certain discretion in how he conducts relations with other parties. The Commissioner deals directly with them and engages in diplomatic dialogue, so long as it does not transgress the bounds set by established guidelines or entail binding commitments of the Union. He has considerable latitude in stating rhetorically his own views (as Patten did in Paris). If he deviates too far from prevailing thinking among Council governments, they will take steps to rein him in. Legally, however, he is accountable to the President of the Commission and, ultimately, the European Parliament, not the Council.

The Parliament gave dramatic and unprecedented demonstration of its powers in 1999 by forcing the resignation of President Jacques Santer and his entire Commission due to alleged derelictions in administration and the abuse of funds. The Parliament thereby strengthened its place in the EU system of separate but interlocking treaty-based structures. The Parliament also has been paying closer attention to Common Foreign and Security Policy. Although having only limited oversight powers, it can act as a tribune of popular sentiment on high-profile issues and can launch investigative task forces. The Parliament's call for an outright ban on depleted uranium weapons is a case in point. A skillful Commissioner can use the Parliament as a counterweight to the Council, indirectly strengthening Patten's hand (in this case) in relation to the High Representative.

The issue of Solana's status vis-à-vis the Commission was sharpened by Commission President Romano Prodi's call for the position of High Representative to be integrated within the Commission. In an address to the European Parliament, Prodi criticized the creation of a post that sowed confusion as to who spoke for the Union and concentrated powers in the hands of the Council that excluded Parliament from performing its function of ensuring proper oversight of actions taken in the name of the Union. Prodi's initiative was part of his campaign to resist attempts to wrest power from the Commission and

relocate it in the Council, as promoted by Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair in their proposals for a revamping of EU institutions. Its effect has been to cloud the outlook for resolution of the inner tension built into the multidimensional EU common foreign and security policy.⁸¹

Thus, an essential feature of the EU setup is that the authority to propose action, the capacity to implement policy, and especially the right to speak for the Union are shared. A definitive determination of responsibilities is unlikely. Of course, any decision involving the European Union in the use or possible use of military force would be the preserve of the Council. But the conduct of diplomacy prior to, in association with, or independent of such action may very well engage the Commissioner for External Relations. Patten gave further evidence of this predilection in his blunt attack on Russian use of coercive methods against Georgia by cutting off gas supplies in retaliation for alleged Georgian acquiescence in allowing Chechen guerrillas to operate from its territory. Linking Russian behavior to its brutal treatment of civilians in the breakaway republic of Chechnya, he admonished his Russian audience in a talk to the Diplomatic Academy in St. Petersburg to observe the rule of law if they wished to develop a healthy relationship with the European Union.⁸²

Conflict prevention strategies and crisis management—broadly construed—cannot be presumed to be the exclusive domain of Solana and his Council-based apparatus. As a consequence, the United States will find itself dealing with a plural European Union. When Washington wants to call “Europe,” it still must dial more than one number, and it may be a conference call. Predictions about the effect these institutional complexities will have on ESDP as it materializes are premature. This ambiguity is not a reason for the United States to disparage the new initiatives as little more than high-sounding verbiage. Rather, it calls for close attention to the inner workings of the Union. The handicaps of mixed mandates and overlapping powers will not invalidate the commitments the EU governments have made. They will, though, make the European Union a singularly difficult party with which to develop a smooth partnership.

The Council itself is not a unitary body. Any EU action in the security field will be undertaken by a collectivity. NATO is a multilateral organization that operates on the consensus principle, but its inherent shortcomings are offset by American leadership. The drawbacks of a coalition that is weakly led or that has no acknowledged leader at all will be manifest. They will be especially pronounced in a

body where the process of consensus-building is highly valued. A strain toward consensus biases collective deliberation and decision in favor of agreement on a lowest common denominator basis. Differences—of interest, of interpretation, of philosophy, of means—tend to get glossed over through selection of the least contentious alternative. Avoidance behavior is typical. Convenience can too easily prevail, and coping becomes the norm. Containing troublesome situations takes priority over achieving optimal outcomes. As EU conduct in the first year of the Yugoslav conflict vividly demonstrated, discretion may be valued more highly than valor. Standard avoidance behavior devices are to focus on the least dangerous aspects of a problem, to emphasize procedure over substance, and to surround agreed courses of action with “fail-safe” provisions that provide bolt-holes for unwelcome contingencies.

The institutional culture and workings of the European Union give reason for concern that ESDP structures too will suffer from the defects of a formal multilateralism. The EU ethos generates strong pressures to reach agreement and to act as one. Protracted discourse is the norm. It has proven itself necessary both to bridge national differences and to build solidarity. It is a *modus operandi* that has evolved for dealing with internal business. The inevitable delays and compromises are accepted as a natural price to pay for an accord that presumptively will provide benefits for all concerned. In other words, the implicit assumption is that all parties will be winners and that the outcome is superior (in terms of a cost/benefit calculus) than what might reasonably be expected from members acting individually. This logic is compelling on economic matters: trade, agriculture, regional support funds, monetary union—the essence of what the community has been about. The same logic does not hold for foreign and security policy.

The designers of ESDP were not blind to the obstacles to timely decision and decisive action by standard EU operating procedures. By emphasizing that the amended TEU concentrates authority in the Council rather than the Commission, they hoped to avoid the most entangling procedures. However, the legal basis for typically cumbersome decisionmaking processes is easier to get around than the customary one. The premiums placed on consensus building will remain. Moreover, the Amsterdam Treaty provisions for “constructive abstention” help to mitigate their negative effects.⁸³ They facilitate coalitions of the willing acting in the name of the Union. Member governments no longer must choose between supporting an action they disagree with or

running the risk of opprobrium by exercising their veto. Unanimity will not be a condition for joint action.

That said, the preference for fashioning a consensus among a broad majority of members will remain. As Alyson Bailes has pointed out, "To formally abstain or to 'opt out' completely from an operation which bears the EU's official name [could] be seen as a failure for the European idea." She goes on to counsel that "If the EU is to avoid this pitfall, it will demand some effort for self-control both from the large states who may be impatient with the hesitation of smaller ones—and smaller states who may have to learn to bridle their consciences and override some national particularities when larger European interests are at stake."⁸⁴

The argument can be made that the more compelling the circumstances—in terms of interests threatened or humanitarian principles affronted—the greater will be the pressure to act with dispatch in making the necessary commitments. However, those circumstances are likely to be the same ones that raise the most serious risks of combat and casualties. Hence, in some situations, the European Union may have the nominal capabilities to handle a problem on its own, yet some members may choose to pursue the option of soliciting U.S. participation for a variety of reasons. Activist, militarily competent states (such as Britain and France) could find themselves hamstrung by the resistance of a competent but politically inhibited Germany backed by a number of small neutral members. Some small states may prefer being subordinated to disinterested America within the wider Alliance framework rather than accepting the dictates from an unofficial *directoire* of their fellow EU states.⁸⁵

The EU readiness to move to the fore, therefore, could be inverse to the need to consider military action. Were the issue of possible troop deployments to arise in reference to a mission for monitoring a cease-fire or establishing an interpositional force, the Union likely would have little reason to defer to NATO. Indeed, features of the emerging EU role as an international actor militate toward a collective European approach. The idea of a concert providing political impetus and direction to ESDP was cast in a new light by the French proposal of a "pioneering group" to lead the Union. Addressing the Bundestag at the end of June, President Chirac invited Germany to join France in heading the group. Defense was cited as one area amenable to this approach.⁸⁶ Anticipating revision of the Union treaty at the end of the year, Chirac stressed the prospect of a new flexibility that could allow a set of like-minded

members to launch projects without the participation or even consent of all members (which the current principle of “constructive abstention” presumes). The French plan met with strong objection in some capitals while getting a cool reception from erstwhile French partner, Germany. The newfound German willingness to join in military actions still requires as much protective cover as it can get. Acting as co-chief of a breakaway group that operates outside the formal ESDP structures runs against the grain of Berlin’s policy of emphasizing the affirmation of a collective Union interest and of observing the stipulated procedures for activating the appropriate provisions of the TEU. To circumvent them would erode the legitimacy of the ESDP. The Chirac initiative does underscore French dedication to exploit fully the opportunity that ESDP opens for a “Europe puissance,” *Europe* being defined as any grouping of states that includes France and excludes the United States.

An informal concert could in principle mitigate the dilatory nature of decisionmaking among 15 states in an organization that is as rule-bound as the European Union. But a concert cannot usurp entirely the rights of small states to approve or reject a proposed policy or action. On internal matters, the Franco-German tandem is a powerful engine of European integration. Their close collaboration was crucial in bringing the EMU project to completion despite formidable obstacles and ambitious goals. The Paris-Berlin partnership is showing signs of fraying, as was evident at Nice where recrimination over whether to adjust the weighting of national votes in the Council and Parliament left both sides feeling ill-used. Relations have been aggravated by Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s promulgation of a grand plan that would constitute the European Union as a full-fledged federation.⁸⁷ Publicized without any prior consultation with Paris, it shook French officials both by its manner of presentation and its outstanding features, which conform to characteristics of the Federal Republic. All the schemes tabled in the emerging great debate about the future EU constitution would result in more, rather than less, formal procedures and mechanisms for taking decisions.

Already, the amount of Union business that can be directed by a concert has definite limits. The credibility of each government with the electorate to which it is accountable turns on clear evidence that Union decisions on CFSP matters are openly arrived at. European publics are becoming more questioning of what is done in their name and ostensibly on their behalf in Brussels. Skepticism is concentrated on the recondite workings of the anonymous Commission. The Council, too, is being

carefully scrutinized. This wave of public skepticism has generated a movement for more transparency in all EU decisionmaking. Expecting an exemption to be made for ESDP would be erroneous. Indeed, the European Parliament in May 2000 passed a resolution calling for the record of the Political and Security Committee meetings to be put in the public domain. Only military operations *per se* would require some qualification of the public's right to know. Otherwise, the very sensitivity of the Union entry into the hard security field demands public reassurance through assiduous efforts to explain fully the whys and wherefores of EU actions. The pressures for strict observance of procedural norms and the principle of open government are especially strong in countries that have not yet fully reconciled themselves to participation in combat missions, whether for reasons of history (such as Germany) or traditions of neutrality.

From the U.S. standpoint, the more transparent the workings of ESDP bodies, the better. The only concern it might have about the transparency movement is that the EU–NATO tie may strengthen the hand of those NATO governments, France above all, that would like to extend the transparency principle to cover communications between SACEUR and SHAPE, on the one hand, and the U.S. Department of Defense, on the other.

A “Holy Alliance”?

Another notable aspect of the maturing EU political personality is its acute sense of its moral underpinnings. The readiness of EU governments to address security issues collectively through Union institutions is heightened by the growing sense of responsibility for forging a pan-European community of democracies. Political elites, if not publics, are rediscovering the moral grounding of European construction. Spurring wealth creation and raising living standards remain the community's core functions. Success provides the firm foundation on which political cooperation depends. However, the larger purpose of overseeing a permanent break from Europe's fractious past is gaining revived prominence. Europe's peace may be divisible in the narrow sense that EU states will not revert to the historical pattern of lethal rivalries no matter what mayhem may erupt in the Balkans. Awareness is sharpening, however, that they have a mission in nurturing a continental environment in which their values and standards of conduct—or, at least, close approximations to them—prevail. In short,

a commitment has been made to giving practical expression to the idea of a Europe whole and free.

The EU expanded sense of responsibility links its internal cohesion and geographical expansion with an obligation to deal with upwellings from Europe's atavistic past (including a readiness to resort to military force). What explains this striking contrast with the reticent behavior demonstrated during the earlier Balkan conflicts has been a shift in moral perspective with practical implications. The European Union is exhibiting traits of a "holy alliance," albeit in the name of secular values. Its members perceive that they have a stake in preventing and, if necessary, opposing behavior in their vicinity that is an affront to the values and norms by which they define themselves. To tolerate the sort of brutal repression occurring in Kosovo would increase the chances of its occurrences elsewhere in Eastern Europe, thereby undercutting their project of extending their Kantian community. Unlike the fearful leaders of the post-Napoleonic holy alliance, the heads of EU governments do not see themselves in direct danger from contagions that could undermine their legitimacy and challenge their regimes. The stake they see is securing a permanent peace beyond their borders by promoting the cause of democracy.

The stern, impulsive reaction to the entry of Jorg Haider's Freedom Party into the Austrian government conforms to the pattern of a holy alliance. The 14 nations that ostracized their fellow EU government were at once upholding the unstated terms of their political compact to exclude nondemocratic elements from governing positions and discouraging like-minded parties in other countries that share Haider's xenophobic agenda. The EU enlargement project might be jeopardized were its vocal ultranationalist opponents in France, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, and Germany emboldened by the enhanced credibility given their cause. Kosovo and the Haider affair in different ways challenged the unfolding of the EU design for a Europe whose peace and stability were based not on contingent judgments of national interest but on undifferentiated adherence to principles that precluded any return to the noxious past.

What practical consequences for the EU security role flow from this rekindled moralism? One is to provide a justification for intervening to resolve nationality conflicts or prevent gross abuses of human rights. The crucial importance of moral outrage and obligation in swinging German public opinion behind the country's historic participation in Operation *Allied Force* and KFOR is a matter of record. It was an

important factor elsewhere as well, albeit without the drama. In neutral member countries and in those with little military tradition, it was the moral imperative that generated support for the military intervention.

Moral outrage as well as the imperative to maintain Western credibility sustained the will and unity during the trying weeks of seemingly fruitless, accident-prone bombing. Imputing a crusading spirit to the post-Kosovo European Union would be an exaggeration. Prudence and proportion are not being thrown to the wind. Still, some things most certainly have changed. Member governments could not possibly behave with the hesitancy, timidity, and divisiveness that marked their behavior in Bosnia. Even the distancing of the community from the Albanian crisis of 1997 could not repeat itself in today's climate. Europe is acquiring a political personality and a moral sense of which ESDP is at once effect and reinforcing cause.

The emerging EU self-image as a moral force adds a complicating element to the ongoing effort to re-equilibrate the Euro-American partnership, laying the basis for a modified division of labor. The discourse in Brussels that stresses EU identity as a community of values makes some American officials uneasy. The United States of course has its own pronounced moralistic streak. It sees itself as the cynosure of the democratic principles that bind together the Western democracies and the fountainhead from which flowed the powerful ideas that inspired opposition to communism in Eastern Europe. America's unique moral authority, in the minds of Americans, has legitimized and confirmed its leadership of the West as much as its military might and economic strength have. The political construct of the West that guides American policy has the overarching transatlantic community as its essential element. Its institutional expression in the security domain, NATO, rightly is presented as the primary venue for collective consultation and the instrument for collective action. Moreover, the NATO enlargement process, complemented by an active Partnership for Peace program, confirms the crucial role of the United States in the enterprise of building stable democracies eastward across Europe.

Correspondingly, the self-conscious effort by EU states to distinguish themselves from America implicitly raises questions as to how the parallel processes of NATO and EU enlargement will relate to each other. The rhetoric of European leaders engaged in an innovative, values-based move to building ESDP may be somewhat inflated; after all, it is intended to boost European self-confidence as much as it is to boast to the Americans. It can be counterproductive, however. When

Javier Solana, speaking on Capitol Hill in January 2000, waxed eloquent on the European Union as a community of values, he was widely viewed as slighting the United States and the larger Atlantic community. The seeming suggestion that Europe had its own political and moral compass could mute enthusiasm at the prospect of having more self-reliant European allies. The lasting effect is to deepen Congressional skepticism about ESDP while concentrating its attention all the more intensely on performance in meeting the Headline Goal. A suspicious Congress will be looking over the shoulder of any administration as it engages the Europeans in working out the terms of collaboration between NATO and the new EU defense organs. That could reduce the flexibility of U.S. negotiators and complicate acceptance of the ambiguity that is inescapable in whatever documents are written.

If one believes that the details of exactly how the two organizations will relate to each other can only be determined in practice (and that the wiring diagrams and procedural manuals cannot be expected to provide for every contingency), then it is important not to be stymied by abstract formulations. If, on the other hand, one sees precise language on jurisdictions and procedure as essential to safeguard NATO primacy, then it would be all the better to approach the process with skeptical concern about European presumption of autonomy in all its aspects—including that of values.

Ironically, the conviction with which European political elites are moving to take a larger hand in building a continent undivided and stable adds to their incomprehension as to why the United States is fixated on the Headline Goal. Even those who are most earnest in their commitment to closing the capabilities gap for the most part would like to see more understanding of the larger purpose the European Union is dedicated to serving. They miss the centrality of the capabilities issue in the wider American debate over interests, obligations, and deployments in troubled regions, above all the Balkans. Demonstration that the European allies are absolutely serious about taking up the burden of policing their own neighborhood is crucial for advocates of an internationalist American foreign policy in countering the forces of insularity and disengagement. Moreover, it strengthens the hand of those who favor a multilateral approach. By fulfilling the longstanding demand of allied burdensharing, it cuts the ground under those opponents of American involvement in peace-enforcing missions such as those undertaken in the Balkans who base their case on a claim of undue American risk and cost in the interest of allies who should be able to

look after things themselves. In this way, the crude indicator of the Headline Goal serves the cause of enlightened Atlanticism.

Engagement with the European Union

The sharpened sense of an EU security identity buttressed by dedicated structures for concerted action will complicate efforts to achieve more regularized and thorough consultation across the Atlantic. The status quo in Euro-American methods for dealing with each other is inadequate. It combines routine dealings in selective areas of cooperation to handle household tasks and high-level meetings at relatively long intervals to address weightier matters. The institutionalization of ESDP may be making that approach outmoded. We have to prepare ourselves for a better organized Europe, which is likely to be more engaged across a wider span of international issues and less deferential to the United States. The frequency of meetings at the ministerial and senior official level, as well as now within the PSC, can be expected progressively to strengthen the sense of solidarity while providing ready opportunities to align common positions.

Hence, the question: should the United States engage the European Union, as a body, in formal policy exchanges? If so, what is the most suitable format? Should it concentrate on troubleshooting thorny problems or opening a strategic dialogue?

The Joint U.S.–EU Action Plan

Promulgated in 1995, the plan inaugurated a series of regular meetings between the U.S. President and the presidencies of the European Commission and Council biannually; at the ministerial level; and in working groups. The latter have proven useful for thrashing out contentious transatlantic issues. At a meeting of the Senior Level Group, an understanding was reached to suspend the EU case against the Helms-Burton Act that had been brought before the WTO. Talks initiated to take the sting out of the confrontation over the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act bore fruit in the breakthrough accord reached at the U.S.–EU summit a year later. It included putting in place a mechanism to provide each other with “warnings” of impending action by either side that could be disputatious—whether it be legislation by the U.S. Congress, a directive of the European Union Commission, or a diplomatic initiative by the Council.⁸⁸

Until now, these meetings have not been taken as the occasion for a strategic dialogue, much less the planning and implementation of

major diplomatic initiatives. They have concentrated on “deliverables”—items whose basics already have been agreed. Important security issues have been left to other venues, mainly NATO. Once the full panoply of ESDP elements is in place, that logic may change. A more encompassing U.S.–EU dialogue, more structured and with administrative support, becomes an institutional possibility once the European Union has the requisite apparatus of its own. The attraction of such an arrangement in most European eyes is that it would add to the status of the Union as an international actor while augmenting collective European influence on those occasions when there is strong consensus on an issue of consequence.

In one respect, that arrangement conforms with the goal of strong supporters of ESDP (for example, France) to establish a “Europe puissance.” Yet a current of thinking, most pronounced in Paris and within the Commission, suggests that “too much” dialogue along with the promised complete transparency of EU (and NATO) deliberations and decisionmaking could undermine the autonomy of EU bodies by opening them to American influence. The present informal practice of giving the U.S. delegation an advance look at major initiatives under consideration (especially in the area of trade) is below the tolerance threshold of EU governments and officials. Proposals to formalize the practice while extending it to ESDP will meet resistance. Nonetheless, a push by the United States for an expanded set of consultations and a strategic dialogue is likely to win favor among enough member governments and Brussels officialdom to turn the idea into reality.

However, does it serve the U.S. interest to deal with its European partners on this basis? The positive element is that it provides for sustained contact, thereby keeping the United States better informed of current attitudes and emerging policies. A hands-on approach provides an opportunity to gain first-hand understanding of the workings of the complex, multifaceted EU institutions while facilitating the forming of personal ties. That cannot fail to open the way to American influence, in some measure, on the internal EU process while weakening the hand of those who prefer to keep the United States at arm’s length. Finally, it creates incentives for the Europeans to clarify the authority and accountability of its representatives, whether they be Solana, Patten, or holders of the rotating presidencies and chairmanships.

One possible drawback of these formal exchanges for strategic dialogue and joint action is that they serve to consolidate the Union as a unitary actor. The United States in effect would be validating a

European entity and conferring on it the status of a strategic partner. Could this lead to the very bifurcation of the Alliance that the United States has so strongly resisted? Dealings between co-equals can readily become the norm—as they have in the trade sphere, where the concentration of power in the hands of the Commissioner for Trade has strengthened considerably the European bargaining position. To reduce the chances of that occurring, the United States could seek to limit the scope of the agenda for U.S.–EU meetings, blacklisting hard defense issues such as national missile defense (NMD). That action could be justified by the presence of non-NATO countries in the European Union. In practice, though, delimiting what are appropriate subjects to place on the U.S.–EU agenda may prove difficult. The argument can be made that any matter of significant concern to the EU member states should be treated collectively. Although manifest differences exist between the American outlook and that of most European allies, the case for the latter to forge a common position is strengthened. NMD is just such an issue—one that to date has not figured on the agenda of the Political and Security Committee. But Solana's venting of European opposition in a forthright public criticism of U.S. policy in April 2000 may be a harbinger of future trends.⁸⁹ If the High Representative sees fit to make NMD an issue for the European Union without being brought to heel by members of the Council, there is no compelling reason to presume that NMD—or some other strategic issue—should not be the subject of deliberation and perhaps a collective diplomatic initiative.

American interests still might be best served by restricting the agenda for U.S.–EU meetings while striving to preserve their informal character. Ultimately, Washington's ability to do so will depend in part on how ESDP consultative bodies develop. The more they serve to generate common positions and policies, the harder it will be for America to avoid dealing with a European bloc. Outright refusal to engage the European Union on soft security matters probably is not a viable option. A less drastic alternative is to encourage the most Atlanticist of EU states to work for an "open" deliberative process that leaves space for the U.S. voice to be heard and avoids locking them into fixed positions. That option also could be attractive to the smaller EU states that worry about ESDP, and the Union common foreign policy in general, being dominated by an implicit *directoire* of Britain, France, and Germany. Italy also has shown a lack of enthusiasm for more ambitious conceptions of ESDP, in part because of a concern that it would be excluded from the circle of the big three. The interest of Italy

and smaller EU states is best served by the combination of a transparent set of ESDP structures and a NATO more open to European influence. In a sense, the two organizations can be seen as counterweights to each other, the outcome being less American dominance of NATO and an ESDP without protective walls sealing it off from American influence. The United States should not reject such an outcome out of hand, since it ensures against decoupling while encouraging its European allies to be more forthcoming in assuming responsibilities.

On strategic matters, several venues for dialogue with the Europeans already exist, *inter alia*: NATO ministerials, summit meetings, and the weekly meetings of Permanent Representatives; outside of NATO, G-8 conclaves and a host of more informal gatherings. The use of the "quint" to deal with ongoing business in the Balkans shows the advantages of a concert approach with limited participation and high flexibility, albeit on nonstrategic issues.

Overall, a mixed strategy is best suited to advancing U.S. interests in a changing transatlantic relationship. The new transatlantic agenda can be productively expanded while maintaining certain redlines. The risk of ensconcing an excessively formal U.S.-EU mode of interaction can be minimized by keeping the supporting secretariat small and actively pursuing bilateral dealings. Some recognition of the unitary status of the Union in these meetings conforms to an inescapable reality. Insisting that the Europeans recognize the U.S. interest in how ESDP evolves and the imperative that authority be clearly designated and accountable should be an objective of American dealings with EU institutions in Brussels as well as of high-level diplomacy. The advantages of a hands-on approach to working with the European Union on security matters are numerous. It deepens knowledge about the workings of the EU system through invaluable first-hand experience; adds to the U.S. Government's pool of resources and collective memory about a complex, multifaceted organization; and tightens potentially useful personal bonds.

At the same time, the United States should work assiduously to conserve the ability to treat directly with allied governments on matters of mutual cardinal interest to us. In the short term, that task should be readily manageable. In the longer term, the centripetal forces generated within the European Union may make that challenge more daunting. Engagement now will facilitate meeting that later challenge.

Asymmetries

Reconciliation of NATO and the European Union is complicated by their asymmetries. NATO is a military alliance whose core is an integrated military command, which is answerable to an intergovernmental council (NAC). Its political side was relatively underdeveloped until after the Cold War. NATO acquired the ability to react quickly and agilely in part by streamlining (and, at times, circumventing) its formal structures and processes. The European Union, by contrast, evolved as a regulatory body, developing and executing common European rules through a necessarily time-consuming procedure entailing numerous, lengthy consultations, and a technocratic style of management. Hence, as Wim van Eekelen has written, "The two organizations have worked in splendid isolation, to all intents and purposes existing in different worlds."⁹⁰ ESDP is a functional departure from past experience. In one sense, it could benefit from its status as a component of a supranational, omnicompetent organization, in particular when addressing latent, if combustible, problems.

The European Union possesses more numerous and varied instruments of influence than does NATO. Even if the emergent EU entity meets its headline objective by 2003, it will not match the military capability of NATO. However, the European Union has more versatility—especially at the level of conflict prevention. It offers one-stop shopping for commercial, financial, monetary, political, and military tools to deflect the behavior of other parties. Short of situations requiring a direct, immediate need for the application of high-end military force, EU members may well see the organization as having a comparative advantage over NATO for managing potential conflict situations. The inclination to work through the Union will be reinforced by the predisposition of some member governments to use the "soft" power of economic inducements and disincentives rather than the blunt threat of military force in strategies for dispute settlement. One can question whether the European Union is better suited to take on the task of conflict prevention. The inventory of resources available as instruments of influence is impressive. However, the mechanisms for activating them expeditiously and applying them skillfully are unproven.

By contrast, the United States in its individual capacity has an equivalent range of assets at its disposal and a half-century of experience in deploying them diplomatically. The demonstrative ability to make timely decisions and to orchestrate the diverse elements of influence is a function of practices and persons long accustomed to the exercise of

power. These tangible and intangible assets are American. They are also NATO assets to the extent that the United States shapes the policies and directs the collective actions of the Alliance. NATO involvement in Bosnia and Kosovo—missions that had a political component as well as a military component—suggests that melding those assets in a multilateral strategy is not easily accomplished, however.

The use or threatened use of military force as part of a strategy of coercive diplomacy entailed a process of consensus building that was strained. It produced a consensus that was tenuous. Integrating military and nonmilitary policy elements was difficult in part because the United States shared the prerogatives of initiation and coordination with its allies and in part because NATO mechanisms for diplomatic concert do not work as smoothly as the integrated military command structures do. In the postcombat phases of the Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts, NATO shared responsibilities for policing and constituting civil institutions with other organizations (particularly the European Union in the latter case). America did not seek to control or actively supervise either effort. Its reticence was due to a number of factors: belief that the European allies had the major stake in Balkan stability, a desire to minimize the financial costs to be borne, and the constraining influence of Congress that opposed long-term commitments of money and manpower.

The common thread in the handling of Bosnia and Kosovo is the unavoidability of multilateralism—within NATO or among NATO, the European Union, and other international bodies. The less leeway the United States has to devise and direct policies, the less practical advantage there is to Washington's unified decisionmaking ability. Consequently, in situations where the European Union may be inclined to take the lead in conflict prevention or crisis management—with the confidence that it has a full panoply of instruments at its disposal—the alternative likely will not be American direction in the traditional manner, certainly not within the European theater, but a sharing of responsibilities. Enhanced military capabilities as envisaged by the ESDP initiative have focused critical attention on who might do what under whose aegis in various contingencies in which European security is threatened. The broader significance of ESDP may well be to sharpen the question of where the authority for integrating elements of collective Western influence will be located and who will exercise it.

Conclusion

Mounting the ESDP project has preoccupied strategic planners on both sides of the Atlantic. The sharp focus on EU–NATO coordination quite naturally has magnified differences, real and imagined, between the United States and Europe. On balance, however, Europe’s progressive integration carries with it enormous benefits for the United States. The European Union is bringing stability and order to post-communist Europe in important respects. Having the Western Europeans play the role of model, mentor, and economic magnet for Central and Eastern Europe has been a central element of American strategy for more than a decade. First sketched by Secretary of State James Baker in his Berlin address of December 1989, the policy accorded the European Union the lead in knitting together the two ends of the continent.⁹¹ It is now launched fully into that endeavor, the hesitations of the early 1990s having given way to bolstered confidence and an expanded sense of responsibility. Union efforts dovetail with the security framework created by an enlarged, reoriented NATO. The two processes are mutually reinforcing even if they are not parts of a carefully synchronized strategy.

ESDP should be placed in this context. It is emerging on a firm, underlying agreement on what a Europe of the future should look like and on its critical ingredients: democracy, enlightened thinking about the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, and dedication to resisting and containing upwellings from Europe’s past. The Western European commitment to achieving an ESDP should be read above all as a sign of mutual trust and collective obligation. That steps toward its realization force some rethinking and some reconfiguration of the Euro-American security partnership is inescapable. All parties in this are “victims” of our collective success. Perspective and patience should be the watchwords as American foreign policy takes up this new challenge.

ESDP is a work in progress whose shape, competence, and mode of action will evolve over time. While the United States is able to influence that process, the determining forces lie within the European Union itself. To exercise its influence constructively, it behooves the United States to think through which manifestations of an ESDP it welcomes, which it can tolerate, and which it should resist as inimical to American interests. Devising suitable policies follows accordingly.

Capabilities

Reaching the Headline Goal for rapidly deployable force would be an unalloyed good; it would bolster European self-confidence, strengthen the American commitment to maintaining a military presence in Europe, and put the Euro-American security partnership on a more equitable (and thereby sounder) footing. Allocating and consolidating the necessary European assets, financial and otherwise, for achieving that end is a wrenching process—one that must overcome budgetary constraints dictated by the Maastricht formula for monetary union, entrenched organizational interests, and residual national parochialism. Gentle reminders from Washington that it is monitoring progress can have a salutary effect, especially so given the varying seriousness with which EU governments take the pledges they made at Cologne, Helsinki, and Nice and the domestic pressures to give priority to social programs. Unceasing chiding from across the Atlantic, though, can be counterproductive. Issuing regular report cards on performance to date will vex European leaders and foster domestic opposition to a project that enjoys only thin popular support. The days when the allies accepted American instruction and tutoring as part and parcel of their strategic protection are gone.

NATO Primacy

A consensus presently exists within the Alliance that NATO remains the primary venue for deliberation and coordinated action. All public declarations affirm that it take charge of any situation that poses a serious threat to European peace and security. However, unanimity has not been achieved on the question of what political role EU structures could and should play before NATO has engaged an issue or, subsequently, in parallel with it. Another question arises as to what discretion the Union would have in mounting its own operations from which the United States has absented itself. Primacy is a non-issue in the sense that there is no dispute among Alliance members that the United States has

the right to participate in any operation it chooses to join. Unlike the situation in the early 1990s, no one (including France) is promoting the European Union (as it did formerly the Western European Union) as a rival instrument for handling peacemaking and peace-enforcing tasks such as those considered in the early phases of the Yugoslav conflicts. If the United States wants in, it gets in—with the applause of almost everyone, in almost all circumstances.

If the United States opts out, the Europeans theoretically have a choice of either mounting an operation under NATO auspices availing themselves of CJTF provisions (as revised to account for the EU substitution for WEU) or acting under EU auspices employing their own assets. As a practical matter, it will be some time, if ever, before the allies will possess the necessary capabilities (such as projection, headquarters, C⁴I) to perform any mission beyond basic peacekeeping ones without tapping NATO resources. Were there a genuine opportunity to choose one course or another, how much of a difference would it make for the United States? Under the CJTF scenario, the United States would retain some influence on how the operation were constituted since the transfer depends on a unanimous decision by the North Atlantic Council. According to some interpretations of such a framework agreement, subsequent consent agreements also would be needed for certain specific asset transfers to be made, as noted earlier. The United States, however, cannot realistically expect that it could indirectly influence a European-only operation by exercising these latent powers to give or withhold consent. Unless Washington has strong reason to oppose the contemplated action, the costs in Alliance solidarity from an attempt to control it remotely would far outweigh the presumed gain from insisting on a place at the table.

A more important set of questions is raised by differing assessments of NATO diplomatic primacy. Foreseeable security problems in Europe are more likely to manifest themselves first as political conflicts than as military ones—meaning the Union is almost certain to be engaged via its Political and Security Committee. The principle of NATO primacy, if strictly applied, would require that the PSC defer to the North Atlantic Council. Two arguments can be made in support of the contention that the United States should insist on observance of this strict constructionist interpretation of NATO and EU Declarations. One cites the disadvantage to the United States of being excluded from a body whose deliberations could prejudice free and open consultation within the North Atlantic Council. The other concern has

to do with the danger of delay and confusion created by the convening of both the EU and NATO bodies. The interlocking arrangements for consultation and coordination agreed in December 2000 do not provide an answer in themselves.

Whatever probability one attaches to either of these eventualities materializing, no obvious foolproof method is apparent for avoiding them completely. What clear, persuasive criteria could be applied to decide when a situation has passed from a political phase to a potential military phase? Furthermore, EU efforts to deal with the question may already have involved economic measures and diplomatic initiatives that in all likelihood would remain elements of a collective Western crisis management strategy. The United States, in any event, would surely have been party to those actions—whether directly or tacitly.

If one visualizes a Kosovo crisis (1998–99) as it might have unfolded with the ESDP structures in place, the PSC most certainly would have convened with the purpose of exchanging views on a problem of cardinal interest to member states, including exploring methods for preventing an aggravation of ethnic hostilities and for halting the growing violence. Such meetings would not have preempted the deliberations of the North Atlantic Council. Rather, the aim would have been to affirm a position in the name of “Europe.” Formal consultations would be supplemented by informal talks, centered on initiatives offered by the larger states.

Were the United States to deem the complications created by these overlapping roles intolerable, it could pursue a strategy of systematically subordinating the European Union to NATO. Thwarting the ambitions of ESDP would require convening the NAC, or at least the NATO Political Committee, at the first signs of an emerging security problem. Activating NATO to address the preconditions of a potential conflict would preempt the EU Political and Security Committee. The primacy of the Atlantic Alliance thereby could be asserted. Such a drastic strategy, however, would entail serious costs, and not solely diplomatic ones. It implicitly would commit the United States to be the leader in managing all manner of disputes as might arise across the continent. That open-ended commitment runs against the grain of public opinion, the prevailing attitude in Congress, and the widely held conviction in policy circles that the United States should be more rather than less reticent about its engagements in places where core national interests are not at stake. Moves to reduce the American contribution to peacekeeping in the Balkans, along with the questioning of whether

future Kosovo-type situations would justify so heavy an American military role, cannot be reconciled with a strategy of expanding the NATO remit and honing its instruments for quick diplomatic action.

The issues raised by the emergence of distinctively European political and security organs should be treated more deftly. A realistic approach should think in terms not of supercedence by NATO but rather of coordination. NATO primacy would be established implicitly by virtue of its encompassing membership. Asserting that primacy by reference to the terms of the EU–NATO accords that have been negotiated may not be necessary. Those accords cannot anticipate all contingencies or lay down so rigorous a set of procedural rules as to preclude differing interpretations of what each organization, singly or jointly, is permitted to do. Inescapably, a political process will determine a EU–NATO division of labor and the exact modes of Euro-American cooperation. Consequently, the United States can best ensure that its position is acknowledged and its interests respected by a sustained diplomatic process.

Official declarations at Cologne, Helsinki, and Nice restrict the contingencies for activation of the postulated rapid reaction corps functionally, to performance of the Petersburg tasks, and geographically, to Europe. The scope of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, for which Mr. Solana is High Representative, knows no such limits, however. The Council-based structures and the Commissioner for External Relations have the latitude to address any aspect of the EU external relations as far afield as the Union determines it has an interest. The quick EU decision to intercede with North Korea to prevent what it feared was a breakdown in ongoing negotiations over Pyongyang's nuclear program and the jeopardizing of the promising South Korean "sunshine policy" was a striking example of how the Union strategic vision is becoming globalized. The practical realization that the European Union could not substitute for a cautious United States should not conceal the fact that the 15 European governments were ready to act in unison, far afield, to offset a perceived dereliction of the United States. As the Treaty of Amsterdam states, "Member states shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest."⁹² Given the global range of EU commercial and financial activity, it implicitly has some interest just about everywhere. More concretely, its technical aid and assistance programs span the globe. Serving the humanitarian ends of economic development and amelioration of affliction, these programs cannot be

separated completely from the political setting in which they occur. More pertinent are aid programs associated with strategies designed to achieve political purposes—for example, bolstering the embryonic Palestinian state and contributing to the peace process, engaging Iran in the hope of encouraging pragmatic political elements—and the extensive network of programs directed at Eastern Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and Russia itself with whom it has a wide-ranging partnership and cooperation agreement.

For the United States, the issue is how to accommodate itself to a European Union that is certain to become a more and more significant actor on the world stage yet whose degree and type of involvement will vary greatly in manner and extent from place to place. The ambiguous nature of this strange superpower complicates American calculations for relating to it. Simple choices do not present themselves. Once one gets beyond the platitude that a vibrant European Union is a force for economic growth and stability in the world (especially on the European continent), no obvious benchmarks exist to guide American policy. It is possible, though, to trace certain trajectories for the Union as an international actor. They in turn can inform the formulation of an American approach to dealing with it.

Some EU governments, and the ESDP secretariat, will be eager that ESDP make its mark. They may avidly seek out opportunities to demonstrate resolve. That could mean variously:

- convening the PSC, Council, or both with the intention of forging a declaratory policy that affirms a common EU position (for example, on renewed tensions in the Balkans, dealing with “rogue” states, the strategic implications of the National Missile Defense initiative); or voicing a “European” viewpoint informally but publicly by the High Representative
- volunteering to take charge of combined operations (as the Eurocorps has done in Kosovo)
- taking the diplomatic lead in response to an imminent crisis.

None of these conjectured actions would be taken without some form of prior consultation with the United States. Rather, the stress would be on doing something distinctly, positively “European.” It might be independent of, or in collaboration with, the United States (when not in reaction to a U.S. policy). Hesitation by an American administration will heighten the expectation in allied capitals that the United States may act in a manner they judge as unsound. The more upset allied governments are by a seeming U.S. bent toward unilateralism, the greater the

likelihood that the European Union will be tempted to seize the occasion to promote itself. Unsure of its unity, competencies, and prerogatives, the ESDP will want to establish a favorable precedent and confirm its new security vocation. A more assertive attitude toward pressing their views on the United States may also form part of this pattern. It would not be impulsive or insensitive to circumstances. But there is a growing feeling that Washington's chronic failure to consult fully and in a timely way has gotten out of hand. A way to make discontent felt is to be uninhibited about airing differing points of view. ESDP could make a difference.

The EU states have gotten into the security business for a combination of self-interested reasons: to strengthen their collective identity, to better balance their dealings with the United States, and to cope with local threats to European peace and stability. Only a few seek the status and attendant burdens of a world power.⁹³ Yet the objective reality of the sheer weight of the European Union as an economic powerhouse and its expanding geographical boundaries point in that direction. So too will the enhanced self-confidence in bringing to fruition its trio of historic projects, the inevitable jolts along the way notwithstanding. How the process unfolds is of the utmost importance for the United States. American interest lies in doing what it can to make each piece of the composite fall into place. ESDP offers the most immediate challenge to American policy.

Recommendations

The primary contribution that the United States now can make to ensuring that the ESDP project achieves its laudable goals in a manner that conforms to American interests is to resolve the remaining elements of uncertainty about the U.S. commitment to making it work. Four matters need to be addressed.

Remove most restrictions on the transfer of technology and equipment that can accelerate European defense modernization programs. Enhanced allied capabilities in PGMs are essential if we are to avoid a two-tier alliance in which the Europeans are limited to performing missions at the lighter end of the force spectrum, whether in conducting operations on their own or participating in combined operations with America. Possible leakage of sensitive technology is a legitimate concern. All reasonable precautions should be taken to ensure that appropriately stringent controls are in place before transfers are made. Zero risk is not achievable, though, and it should not be the

reference mark for determining the suitability of granting export licenses or approving joint ventures between transatlantic industrial partners.

The established practice of differentiating among allied governments in terms of their trustworthiness in handling proprietary technology is losing its viability. In the past, the United States has provided knowledge to Britain in several sensitive areas (for example, cruise missiles and the product of satellite intelligence) on the understanding that the information would not be passed on to other allied governments—such as France. That practice must change. The European pooling of assets, along with their promotion of cross-national arms consortia, obviates the discretionary judgment that the United States has had in deciding who is eligible to possess what American-held technology.⁹⁴ To the extent that trust is a measure of practices and procedures, it is reasonable to encourage all ESDP governments to emulate those now in force in the most “responsible” countries. To the extent that it is a measure of policy, it is appropriate and desirable that Washington make transfers conditional on observance of a clear code of conduct. By raising the stakes for the European Union as a whole of any transgressions, peer pressure should lead to strict standards and close monitoring. The Defense Trade Security Initiative (DTSI) launched at the NAC ministerial in Florence in September 2000 is a major step in the right direction. Reconciling the more restrictive State Department position with the more liberal DOD position, the initiative represents a serious reform of the U.S. defense export control system. As presented by then Secretary of State Albright, the DTSI “facilitates U.S. companies’ efforts to enter into joint arrangements with allies’ companies; allows European companies to participate more easily with U.S. companies in bidding on U.S. Defense Department programs; and provides for expedited licensing for defense trade . . . with a ten-day turnaround in most cases.”⁹⁵ This landmark initiative deserves to be expeditiously implemented and actively pursued. Where Congressional approval is required to act on certain elements of the initiative, the administration should present it as integral to the much desired strengthening of allied capabilities.

Redouble efforts to finalize accords between NATO and the European Union on CJTF arrangements and procedures. Sound reasons exist for putting in place expeditious procedures for the European allies to gain access to U.S.-held Alliance assets. The United States has wisely accepted the principle that access to NATO assets will be made available as an overall package based on agreements reached through joint

PSC/NAC talks. A liberal, forthcoming approach in handling these matters serves the American interest in avoiding the creation of incentives for the allies to invest monies from static defense budgets in acquiring means that the United States is in a position to provide.

This approach is especially true for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. While carefully targeted investments by the Europeans to upgrade their capabilities in this area are necessary and desirable, scarce resources should be concentrated in the areas of most acute need. Their readiness to rely on the United States for such things as satellite imagery and headquarters using command, control, communications, and computers under the terms of arrangements now being worked out between NATO and the European Union is qualified by what some allied governments have perceived as an American reluctance to share satellite intelligence fully. To whatever extent this reading of the record is justified, the perception itself needs to be addressed. Reassurances that the activation of CJTF arrangements will yield a good faith effort on the part of the United States to make fully available intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets and products pertinent to the mission could allay doubts. The forthright offers made by the United States, in talks between military experts of the EU 15 and SHAPE, to share strategic reconnaissance and intelligence are steps in the right direction. Follow-up is in order to refute the arguments of those who disparage them as gestures intended to dilute European interest in acquiring independent capabilities.⁹⁶

Move to build a consensus with the Congress on the framework of American policy toward ESDP and related issues. The European experience in dealing with a dual government in Washington disturbs their attempts to find common ground with the United States on the terms of a modified transatlantic security partnership. Congressional initiatives such as the Byrd-Warner resolution to set a definite date for withdrawal of American troops from KFOR trigger anxiety that their initiative may have unwanted consequences—such as calling into question continued and future American participation in missions where U.S. weight and standing are indispensable. They need consistent policies and stable commitments to keep their own planning on a straight course. The Executive, in turn, should seek explicitness from the Europeans about their designs and intentions so as to be better positioned to address Congressional concerns.

Find new ways to improve transatlantic consultation before deciding and acting on matters that affect Alliance interests. Perceptions of American unilateralism are antithetical to the goal of keeping the Europeans committed to working in tandem with the United States and their continued willingness to accord NATO primacy. The handling of the NMD issue illustrates the costs of a failure to observe this maxim. We need to be more conscious of how sensitive the allies are to signs that the United States believes that its dominance allows it to disregard the views and interests of its partners.

The scope of issues addressed through the ESDP machinery, along with their geographical range, will expand over time. A key to translating that movement into a strategic concert is frank and open exchanges on matters that the United States has tended to treat as its private preserve. Modification of existing practices is well justified by the potential benefits of a vital Euro-American partnership.

The European effort to make a success of ESDP will be a struggle—often perplexing, at times vexing for the United States. However, we cannot afford to treat it as a spectator sport. The American national interest is linked to the outcome of the “European” enterprise. It is incumbent on the United States to stay engaged with the Europeans as ESDP develops in the context of a Union striving to reconstitute itself. Engagement means sustained discourse with national governments and representatives of supranational bodies: the Commission, the Council secretariat, the European parliament. It also means attentiveness to how the several spheres of Union initiative and activity intersect: enlargement, monetary union, Constitutional reform, trade negotiations, and the intra-Union politics associated with each. For the United States both to have some constructive influence on these processes and to reap the common benefits from their successful completion, that engagement should involve parts of the government whose contact with the European Union in the past has been slight or episodic. ESDP poses that challenge for the American defense establishment in particular. Engagement entails routine consultation informed by in-depth knowledge of a political entity that is becoming a superpower, albeit an unconventional one, with whom the United States has common business of cardinal importance.

Principal Institutions of the European Union

European Council. The European Council is composed of heads of state and government and the Commission President who meet at least once every half year. It “shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the general policy guidelines thereof” (article 4, TEU). The European Council is “to decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where the Member States have important interests in common.” The direct involvement of the European Council in CFSP and ESDP adds political weight and commits the highest political authorities in member states.

Council of Ministers. EU Foreign Ministers meet at least once a month as the General Affairs Council (GAC) in which the Commission is represented by the competent commissioner in charge of external relations. According to the Treaty (article 13), the Council “shall take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing” the CFSP and ESDP “on the basis of the general guidelines defined by the European Council.” It “shall recommend Common Strategies to the European Council and implement these, in particular by adopting joint actions and common positions” and “ensure the unity, consistency, and effectiveness of action by the Union.” The Council is the general forum for information and consultation on CFSP and ESDP matters among Member States (article 16, TEU). The GAC has overall responsibility for preparatory work for the European Council; consequently, matters to be submitted to the European Council must first be submitted to the GAC. The Council and the Commission are jointly responsible for “the consistency of the Union’s external activities as a whole in the context of its external

relations, security, economic and development policies” and “shall cooperate to this end” (article 3, TEU).

Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). Permanent Representatives of Member States to the European Union and the Commission Deputy Secretary General meet once a week to prepare Council meetings and decisions, including those related to CFSP and ESDP. COREPER has overall responsibility for preparing the work of the Council in all its compositions. This means that all items submitted to the Council must previously have been placed on the agenda of COREPER, which, if need arises, endeavors, at its level, to reach an agreement to be submitted for adoption by the Council. (COREPER can attach comments and recommendations to opinions submitted to the Council by the Political Committee.)

European Commission. The Commission is the operating executive of the European Union. It proposes legislation, is responsible for administration, and ensures that the provisions of the treaties and the decisions of Union institutions are properly implemented. It manages the budget and represents the Union in international trade negotiations. The 20 Commissioners are appointed for 5-year terms; their appointment is confirmed by the European Parliament. The Commission President is appointed by agreement among the member governments also for a term of 5 years. The Commissioner for External Relations shares responsibilities with the Commissioners for Trade, Enlargement, Development Policy, and Economic Affairs. He chairs a committee composed of the five Commissioners, charged with coordinating the external policies of the Commission and defining strategic objectives. He is supported by a Directorate General created specifically to deal with the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

European Parliament. The European Parliament is consulted and kept informed regularly. According to the Treaty (article 21), “The Presidency shall consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. The European Parliament shall be kept regularly informed by the Presidency and the Commission of the development of the Union’s foreign and security policy. The European Parliament may ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it. It shall hold an

annual debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy.” The Presidency and/or the Commission can attend the meetings of Parliament’s committee on Foreign Affairs and Security and participate, if need be, in Parliamentary debates in plenary session. At Council meetings, the Presidency informs the Council of Parliament’s reactions, communications, questions, recommendations, or resolutions concerning CFSP and ESDP.

Endnotes

¹ A uniquely insightful European perspective on the genealogy of ESDI is provided by one of its progenitors, former Secretary General of the Western Union Willem van Eekelen, in *Debating European Security* (The Hague: SDU Publishers, 1998). See also Cameron Fraser, *The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union* (Sheffield, England: Academic Press, 1999).

² North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, June 3, 1996.

³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Communiqué*, Washington, DC, April 24, 1999.

⁴ Cologne European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, June 3–4, 1999.

⁵ Helsinki European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, December 10–11, 1999.

⁶ U.K.-France summit, *Joint Declaration on European Defence*, St. Malo, December 4, 1998.

⁷ Western European Union Council of Ministers, *The Petersburg Declaration*, Bonn, June 19, 1992.

⁸ European Council, *Presidency Conclusions Report on the European Security and Defence Policy*, Nice, December 4–5, 2000, introduction.

⁹ Jacques Chirac, press conference, Nice, December 12, 2000.

¹⁰ *Joint Declaration on European Defence*.

¹¹ Department of Defense, *Strengthening Transatlantic Security: A U.S. Strategy for the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2000).

¹² Joschka Fischer, press conference at WEU summit, Bremen, May 10, 1999. A perceptive appraisal of European ambivalence toward the United States and their continued dependency relationship is given by François Heisbourg in “American Hegemony? Perceptions of the U.S. Abroad,” *Survival* 41, no. 4 (Winter 1999/2000).

¹³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Defense Capabilities Initiative*, Washington, DC, April 25, 1999.

¹⁴ François Heisbourg et al., *European Defence: Making It Work*, Chaillot Paper 42 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2000), 38. A more drastic set of proposals, which would lead to a binary U.S.–EU alliance, has been put forward by three prominent figures in the European policy debates; see Gilles Andreani, Christoph Bertram, and Charles Grant, *Europe’s Military Revolution* (London: Centre for European Reform, 2001).

¹⁵ Christopher Meyer, speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies Conference, Washington, DC, October 10, 2000.

¹⁶ The term *acquis* is used in the European Union and European discourse generally to refer to policy areas where there is an established, fixed commitment to supranational approaches.

¹⁷ Tony Blair, speech to the Polish Stock Exchange, Warsaw, October 6, 2000; Jacques Chirac, speech to the Bundestag, July 28, 2000. The Blair and Chirac speeches were prompted in part by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer’s evocation of a federal union in his studiously provocative speech, “From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration,” Berlin, May 12, 2000.

¹⁸ “Toward a Strategic Alliance,” *European Affairs*, no. 2 (April 12, 2000).

¹⁹ *Strengthening Transatlantic Security*, 5.

²⁰ Cologne European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*.

²¹ Heisbourg et al., 36. The diversity of European governments’ attitudes toward military intervention is examined by Martin Ortega, *Military Intervention and the European Union*, Chaillot Paper 45 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2000).

- ²² European Union Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, Santa Maria da Feira, June 20, 2000.
- ²³ Shifting European perceptions for U.S. leadership are analyzed by Heisbourg in "American Hegemony?"
- ²⁴ Charles A. Kupchan, "In Defence of European Defence: An American Perspective," *Survival* 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000). Kupchan notes that "After the war, despite the success of the air campaign and the absence of a single NATO combat casualty, the U.S. Senate's main reaction was to pass unanimously a resolution bemoaning the 'significant shortcomings' in European defense capabilities, and urging the European Union to rectify the 'overall balance' within the Alliance."
- ²⁵ Richard Holbrooke has sketched a vivid picture of that frenetic period in his personal account of administration policymaking, *To End a War* (New York: Random House, 1998). For another perspective, see Ivo H. Daalder, *Getting to Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2000).
- ²⁶ European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, annex II (Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management), Feira, June 20, 2000.
- ²⁷ The broad debate on intervention is examined by Richard H. Haass, *Intervention: The Use of American Power In the Post-Cold War World* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994).
- ²⁸ Hubert Védrine, interview, *l'Express*, February 28, 1999.
- ²⁹ The evolution of German thinking about the scope and form of its role in European security affairs is analyzed by Daniel Vernet, "Shrewd Exploitation of Limited Sovereignty," *Internationale Politik* 1 (Spring 2000). See also the thoughtful, skeptical appraisal of Germany's future role in European security by Hanns W. Maull, "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?" *Survival* 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000).
- ³⁰ Hubert Védrine, interview, *Libération*, November 24, 1998.
- ³¹ German-Russian summit, *Communiqué*, Berlin, June 16, 2000.
- ³² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Communiqué*, article 38, Washington, DC, April 24, 1999.
- ³³ European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, annex IV, Helsinki, December 10–11, 1999.
- ³⁴ *Ibid.*
- ³⁵ Maull, 77.
- ³⁶ For a critical review of this debate, see Donald A. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, "Kosovo and the Great Airpower Debate," *International Security* 24, no. 4 (Spring 2000).
- ³⁷ Klaus Neumann, remarks, Conference on Implementing the ESDP: The Transatlantic Dimension at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC, February 14, 2000.
- ³⁸ Michael Cooper, "Cheney Urges Rethinking Use of U.S. Ground Forces In Bosnia and Kosovo," *The New York Times*, September 1, 2000.
- ³⁹ Alain Richard, "Défense Européenne et souveraineté," Paris, October 20, 2000.
- ⁴⁰ Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001).
- ⁴¹ The benign attitude toward ESDP that some senior U.S. officers express reflects the hope that a better-armed set of allies could relieve them altogether of disagreeable missions they could do without as well as reduce the demands placed on overextended American forces called upon to perform unconventional missions.
- ⁴² Michael Evans, "General Wanted U.S. To Call the Shots in Kosovo," *The Times* (London), January 27, 2000. The definitive account of the policy debates and strategic calculations by the Clinton administration is provided by Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2000).
- ⁴³ See the critique of NATO decisionmaking by Guillaume Parmentier, "Redressing NATO's Imbalance," *Survival* 42, no. 1 (Summer 2000); see also *Lessons From Kosovo* (Paris: Délégation à l'Information et à la Communication de la Défense, November 1999). The official DOD post-mortem on the Kosovo crisis is *Kosovo/Operation Allied Force, After-Action Report to Congress*, January 31, 2000. The issues of military strategy are treated in the wider context of crisis management by David S. Yost, "The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union," *Survival* 43, no. 2 (Winter 2000/2001).
- ⁴⁴ Heisbourg et al., 38.
- ⁴⁵ Klaus Naumann, "Implementing the European Security and Defense Policy: A Practical Vision for Europe," *Bulletin of the Atlantic Council of the United States* 11, no. 3, August 2000.

⁴⁶ A Turkish veto on NATO cooperation in building ESDI suspended this collaboration early in 2001. Closely related to Ankara's obstruction of accords on terms of EU access to other NATO assets, it was lifted in April. See Judy Dempsey and Alexander Nicoll, "EU and NATO to hold talks on military planning," *The Financial Times*, April 24, 2001.

⁴⁷ European Council-General Affairs/Defense Committee, *Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration*, November 20, 2000.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Jim Geraone, "More Work Needed on Defense Capabilities Initiative," Armed Forces Information Service, December 5, 2000.

⁵⁰ See the analysis of ESDP capabilities and military spending in the *Strategic Survey 2000–2001* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001).

⁵¹ See Robert Graham, Alexander Nicoll, and Haig Simonian, "Paris to Press Berlin on Military Aircraft," *The Financial Times*, June 11, 2001. In contrast to Germany, the French 5-year military program budget kept spending at present levels for 2002–2003 while increasing procurement by 0.8 percent. That represented a compromise between President Chirac, who pressed for an increase in the defense budget, and the Jospin government. See "La loi de programmation militaire 2003–2008," announced August 1, 2001.

⁵² Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration, paragraph 6.

⁵³ North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, *Final Communiqué*, Brussels, December 14–15, 2000.

⁵⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Communiqué*, article 10, Washington, DC, April 24, 1999.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ U.S. Congress, House Resolution 59, November 2, 1999; U.S. Senate Resolution 208, November 8, 1999. For a detailed analysis of the Congressional role in the debate over ESDP, see Stanley R. Sloan, *The United States and European Defense*, Chaillot Paper 39 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2000).

⁵⁷ European Union summit, *Presidency Conclusions*, appendix II, Feira, June 20, 2000.

⁵⁸ Chris Patten, speech, "The Future of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and the role of the Commission," London, December 16, 1999.

⁵⁹ Quoted by Judy Dempsey and Alexander Nicoll, "When push comes to shove," *The Financial Times*, April 29, 2001. The Turkish position was fully spelled out by Foreign Minister Ismail Cem in "A necessary role in defence," *The Financial Times*, May 29, 2001.

⁶⁰ North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, *Final Communiqué*, December 14–15, 2000.

⁶¹ William Cohen, comments at the Defense Ministers Session, North Atlantic Council, Brussels, December 5, 2000. U.S. Ambassador to NATO Alexander Vershbow voiced American apprehensions about the building of ESDP some weeks earlier; see Simon Taylor, "U.S. ambassador delivers stark warning on defence planning," *European Voice*, November 8, 2000. Intense negotiations to reconcile American concerns with ESDP institution building succeeded in producing the compromise formulations incorporated in the Nice and Brussels Declarations.

⁶² Alexander Nicoll, "Cohen says European rapid reaction force must use NATO military planners," *The Financial Times*, December 7, 2000.

⁶³ "Meet Your New European Army," *The Economist* 357, no. 8198 (November 25, 2000).

⁶⁴ Jean-Pierre Kelche, *Le Monde*, December 9, 2000.

⁶⁵ Quoted in Nicoll, *The Financial Times*, December 7, 2000.

⁶⁶ Richard, "Défense Européenné et souveraineté."

⁶⁷ North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, *Final Communiqué*, December 15, 2000, 10.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Alexander Nicoll and Judy Dempsey, "EU force may plan apart from NATO," *The Financial Times*, April 30, 2001.

⁷⁰ European Council, *Presidency Conclusions Report on the European Security and Defence Policy*, annex III, Nice, December 4–5, 2000.

⁷¹ Ibid., annexes IV, V.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ EU representatives also played a role in arranging for the voluntary removal of KLA elements from the Peasevo valley in southern Serbia. They worked with NATO officials to ensure an accord whereby the KLA renounced violence in accepting the return of Serbian police authority under

international supervision.

⁷⁴ The implications of where the point of gravity for the EU's CFSP is located are examined by Gilles Andréani in "Why Institutions Matter," *Survival* 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000).

⁷⁵ Treaty on European Union, article 26.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Chris Patten, speech at Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Paris, June 11, 2000.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Patten, "The Future."

⁸⁰ Treaty of Amsterdam, article 5.

⁸¹ Romano Prodi, address to the European Parliament, October 3, 2000. Prodi elaborated on his idea for a prominent Commission role in EU foreign and security policy in a speech at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques in Paris, May 29, 2001.

⁸² See Andrew Jack, "Patten hits at Russia over Georgia," *The Financial Times*, January 19, 2001.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Alyson Bailes, "Europe and the U.S.: Organizing the Cooperation Between NATO and WEU/EU," Deutsche Gesellschaft für Ad hoc-Publizität, summer school, August 20, 1999.

⁸⁵ How the complex inner dynamics of the European Union intersect the evolving security relationship between Europe and the United States is the subject of a rigorous and insightful analysis by the contributors to *European Defence: Making It Work*. See especially the essays by François Heisbourg, Nicole Gnesotto, and Karl Kaiser.

⁸⁶ Jacques Chirac, address to the Bundestag, July 28, 2000.

⁸⁷ See the appraisal of Schroeder's plan in "Gerhard Schroeder's EU vision," *The Economist*, April 30, 2001. The French reaction was voiced by Pierre Moscovici, Minister for European Affairs, "La réponse a Schroder ne sera pas fade," *Le Monde*, May 11, 2001.

⁸⁸ The Transatlantic Partnership on Political Cooperation contains a joint EU-U.S. commitment to "resist the passage of economic sanctions legislation based on foreign policy goals," Washington, DC, December 1998.

⁸⁹ Javier Solana's remarks are reported in Jane Perlez, "U.S. Missile Plan Could Hurt Security Ties: European Says," *The New York Times*, May 2, 2000.

⁹⁰ Willem van Eekelen, "Building European Defence: NATO's ESDI and the European Union's ESDP," Rapporteur NATO Parliamentary Assembly Defence and Security Committee, April 18, 2000.

⁹¹ James A. Baker, speech to the Berlin Press Club, December 13, 1989.

⁹² Treaty of Amsterdam, article 16.

⁹³ See Peter Rodman's appraisal of the unsteady EU climb towards world power status: *Drifting Apart? Trends In U.S.-Europe Relations* (Washington, DC: The Nixon Center, June 1999).

⁹⁴ An overview toward consolidation in the European defense sector is given by Burkard Schmitt, *From Cooperation to Integration: Defence and Aerospace Industries in Europe*, Chaillot Papers 40 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2000).

⁹⁵ Intervention by Madeleine K. Albright at the North Atlantic Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, December 14, 2000, 7.

⁹⁶ See the well-informed, incisive treatment of these issues by Charles Grant in Heisbourg et al., chapter five.

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

President: Vice Admiral Paul G. Gaffney II, USN

Vice President: Ambassador Robin Lynn Raphael

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Director: Stephen J. Flanagan

PUBLICATION DIRECTORATE

Director and Editor, Joint Force Quarterly: Robert A. Silano

General Editor, NDU Press: William R. Bode

Supervisory Editor, NDU Press: George C. Maerz

National Defense University Press

ATTN: NDU–NSS–PD

300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62)

Fort Lesley J. McNair

Washington, D.C. 20319–5066

Telephone: (202) 685–4210

Facsimile: (202) 685–4806

About INSS Publications

Print Publications

For general information on publications and other programs of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, consult the National Defense University Web site at <http://www.ndu.edu>. To request a complimentary copy of available NDU Press titles, contact ndupress@ndu.edu via e-mail or leave a voice message at (202) 685–4210. Most NDU Press titles can be purchased from the U.S. Government Printing Office; call (202) 512–1800 or order on-line at <http://www.access.gpo.gov>.

Electronic Publications

Numerous titles published by NDU Press are available on-line at <http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/press/ndup2.html>.

Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ)

The journal publishes articles, reviews, professional notes, and other features by military officers, defense analysts, and scholars on the integrated employment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces. *JFQ* focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare, contingency planning, combat operations conducted by unified commands, and joint force development. For current and back numbers of the journal, visit the *JFQ* Home Page maintained on the Joint Doctrine Web site at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/index.htm.

From the introduction to

Europe's New Security Vocation

For the United States, having more militarily capable allies who are ready to shoulder heavier burdens has been a long-time goal, one that became more compelling in light of the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Allies able to do the difficult job of peacemaking and peacekeeping could ease the demands on the United States to police a continent where nationality conflicts, which do not affect core American interests, are the main threat to peace. Furthermore, the cumulative effects of protracted peacekeeping engagements on military resources and morale are a growing concern. A more equitable distribution of duties also conforms to the U.S. reluctance to back committing its troops to missions that risk casualties in doubtful causes that affect West Europeans more directly than they do the United States.

Recent titles in the McNair Paper series:

65

Agricultural Bioterrorism: A Federal Strategy to Address the Threat

Henry S. Parker

64

The Strategic Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran

Kori N. Schake *and*
Judith S. Yappe

63

All Possible Wars? Toward a Consensus View of the Future Security Environment, 2001–2025

Sam J. Tangredi

62

The Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the Next QDR

Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr.

61

Illuminating Tomorrow's War

Martin C. Libicki